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My dissertation aims at understanding how firms’ adoption of labor-saving
production technologies affects their investment and employment decisions; and, ul-
timately, their stock returns.
Chapter 1 theoretically studies a firm’s decision to replace its routine-task
labor with machines over the business cycle, and explores the asset pricing implica-
tions of this decision. The model extends the classical investment-based asset pricing
models in which a firm’s investment decisions are modeled as exercising real options.
I extend the set of firm’s real options to include both growth options, which increase
the firm’s output, and technology switching options, which increase the firm’s ef-
ficiency, and focus on the latter options. A key assumption in my model is that
switching from using routine-task labor to using machines interrupts firm produc-
tion. Hence, the firm optimally chooses to make this switch when its profitability is
low in order to minimize opportunity cost. As a result, if the economy experiences a
negative shock, firms with routine-task labor can improve their value through exer-
cising these switching options, making their value less sensitive to aggregate shocks.
vi
In the cross-section, firms with a higher share of routine-task labor should have lower
expected rates of return for their stocks.
Chapter 2 constructs an empirical measure of firms’ share of routine-task
labor, namely, RShare, and presents tests of the model’s predictions on the invest-
ment, employment, and asset prices of firms with high and low RShares. I classify
occupations into routine- and non-routine-task labor, following the labor economics
literature, and I use the establishment-level occupational data from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to construct RShare at the firm level. Consistent with my model’s
predictions, I find that within an industry, firms with a higher share of routine-
task labor (i) invest more in machines and reduce disproportionately more of their
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Literature Review
In this section, I review the existing theoretical and empirical literature related to
labor-technology substitution and to the cross-sectional asset pricing. I also discuss
the connection and contribution of each of my chapters to the literature.
Investment-Based Asset Pricing Theory
Chapter 1 adds to existing literature by introducing a new channel through
which investment opportunities impact asset prices. The majority of studies in this
area regard investment opportunities as growth options (see Berk, Green, and Naik
(1999), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004),
Zhang (2005), Liu, Whited, and Zhang (2009), and Ai and Kiku (2013), among
others). To the best of my knowledge, Chapter 1 is the first paper to study the
asset pricing implications of a firm’s switching options to reduce production costs
through labor-technology substitution. By separating growth options (to increase
output) and switching options (to increase efficiency) in my model, I show that
while growth options increase firms’ exposure to systematic risk, switching options
lower that exposure. Thus, my model complements existing theories and improves
our understanding of the links between firms’ investment opportunities and stock
1
returns.
Labor and Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing
My empirical findings in Chapter 2 contribute to a growing literature on labor
heterogeneity and the cross-section of stock returns.1 Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou
(2013) show that firms with a high level of organization capital are more exposed to
priced technology frontier shocks, since key talent that owns a firm’s organization
capital can walk away in response to these shocks. Donangelo (2014) shows that
firms in industries with mobile workers are more exposed to aggregate shocks, since
mobile workers can walk away for outside options in bad times, making it difficult
for capital owners to shift risk to workers. My work differs from these studies by
exploring a new aspect of labor heterogeneity, namely, the heterogeneous ability of
a firm to replace its workers with machines. Hence, Chapter 2 derives the effect of
labor heterogeneity on firm risk through the channel of investment opportunities,
while most previous studies derive this effect through operating leverage.
Embodied Technology and Cross-Sectional Asset Pricing
This thesis is also related to recent studies on embodied technology and the
cross-section of stock returns.2 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) show that shocks
1A partial list of papers in this literature is Gourio (2007), Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina
(2011), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), Kuehn, Simutin, and Wang (2013), Belo, Lin, and Baz-
dresch (2014), Donangelo (2014), Belo, Lin, Li, and Zhao (2015), Donangelo, Gourio, and Palacios
(2015), and Tuzel and Zhang (2015), among others.
2A partial list of papers in this literature is Papanikolaou (2011), Garleanu, Panageas, and Yu
(2012), Garlappi and Song (2013), Kogan and Papanikolaou (2013), and Kogan and Papanikolaou
(2014), among others.
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to technologies embodied in new capital equipment affect the cross-section of stock
returns. My paper does not address shocks to labor-saving technology that is em-
bodied in machines. Rather, I show that a firm’s decision to adopt labor-saving
technology is related to the business cycle. Hence, while previous studies tend to
assume embodied technological shocks as a second risk factor, my model maintains
a single risk factor that is based on aggregate shocks.
Skill-Biased Technological Change in Labor Economics
My empirical measure of routine-task labor in Chapter 2 is based on recent
labor economics literature on skill-biased technological change. Starting with the
seminal work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), who provide a novel measure of
routine-task labor to proxy for jobs that can be substituted by computerization, an
emerging literature analyzes and improves this measure.3 I improve the latest version
of this measure that is used by Autor and Dorn (2013) to account for changes in
technology over time. Applying the measure to detailed establishment-level data, this
paper is the first to measure firm-level share of routine-task labor. While most studies
focus on the secular trend of routine-task labor being replaced by computerization,
my work is the first to analyze firms’ decision on labor-technology substitution over
the business cycle and its implications for stock returns.4
3Acemoglu and Autor (2011) provide a comprehensive review of this literature.
4Jaimovich and Siu (2014) study how routine-task labor contributes to the connection of job
polarization and jobless recovery over the business cycle, but do not explore the substitutability of
routine-task labor by technology.
3
Production Functions in Macroeconomics
This thesis builds on the macroeconomics and labor economics literature.
Specifically, my model setup is based on earlier studies that analyzes heterogeneous
labor and capital inputs in production functions. Stokey (1996) considers a three-
factor production function that treats skilled labor, unskilled labor, and physical
capital as separate production factors and assumes physical capital as a substitute
for unskilled labor. Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000) extend this
framework by further dividing physical capital into structure and equipment and
emphasizing that only technologies that affect the stock of equipment can impact the
wage spread between skilled and unskilled labor. More recently, Autor, Levy, and
Murnane (2003) explicitly model routine-task labor and computers as substitutable
production factors and show that the decline in routine-task jobs is associated with
the increased use of computers. In Chapter 1 of this thesis, instead of modeling a
firm’s production function, I model firms as having two types of projects. While both
types of projects require some non-routine-task labor, they differ in that unautomated
projects require routine-task labor while automated projects require machines.
4
Chapter 1
A Task-Based Asset Pricing Model
1.1 Introduction
As technology evolves, machines tend to replace labor in certain jobs. Historical
examples from the Industrial Revolution include the spinning jenny and the auto-
matic loom replacing hand labor. More recent examples include calculators, word
processors, automatic tellers, and robotic arms replacing large numbers of workers in
procedural and rule-based jobs, i.e., routine-task labor.1 Prior literature shows that
the disappearance of routine-task jobs tends to occur during recessions rather than
expansions, and that such job disappearance constitutes almost all job loss in the
three most recent recessions.2 This evidence suggests that labor-technology substi-
1Examples of routine-task labor over the past 30 years include clerks, travel agents, production
line assemblers, bank tellers, and tax preparers. Throughout this paper, I use machines to refer to
both equipment and software.
2Jaimovich and Siu (2014) show that in the 1990, 2001, and 2008-09 recessions, routine-task
jobs, which account for about half of the total employment, constitute 89%, 91%, and 94% of all
job loss, respectively. The authors also show that essentially all job loss in routine-task occupations
occurs in recessions and is not recovered after the recessions.
5
tution is an economically important decision that varies with the business cycle.
To explore how firms exercise the option to replace routine-task labor with
machines, I develop a structural model. The key insight of my model hinges on
that replacing routine-task labor with machines interrupts production. Firms thus
optimally undertake such replacement when productivity is low. Hence, if the econ-
omy experiences a negative shock, firms with more routine-task labor can better
improve their value through undertaking the replacement, making them less exposed
to systematic risk.
More specifically, in the model, a firm generates cash flows from two substi-
tutable groups of projects. One group uses machines to perform routine tasks (au-
tomated projects) while the other uses routine-task labor (unautomated projects).3
Because machines are cheaper to use than routine-task labor, unautomated projects
embed a switching option to become automated. A key assumption is that adopt-
ing machines takes time as the firm needs to adapt the technology embodied in the
machines to its project.4 During this adoption period, the project generates zero
output. To minimize the production loss, the firm switches a project from unauto-
mated to automated only when the project is generating low cash flows. Hence, if
3Examples of earlier studies using project-level setup include Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and
Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014). My setup differs from theirs in the sense that I model project
heterogeneity based on their production types, rather than, for example, projects’ risk types as in
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999). In this sense, my model focuses more on the micro-foundation of
project differences.
4This assumption is proposed by literature on the slow diffusion of new technology. For instance,
in the New Economy Handbook, Hall and Khan (2003) point out that: “[...] the costs (of adopting
a new technology), especially those of the non-pecuniary ‘learning’ type, are typically incurred at
the time of adoption and cannot be recovered. There may be an ongoing fee for using some types
of new technology, but typically it is much less than the full initial cost.”
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the economy experiences a negative shock, firms with a high share of routine-task
labor (and more unautomated projects) can better improve their value by reducing
future production costs through technology switching. As a result, these firms have
lower exposure to systematic risk and hence lower expected returns.5
It is important to note that firms in this model can also undertake new
projects.6 In line with the assumption that automation takes time, I assume that
new unautomated projects can start generating cash flows faster than new auto-
mated projects, making the former preferable to the latter when the firm expands
its production during economic booms.7 In equilibrium, while existing unautomated
projects are switched, new unautomated projects are also undertaken, leading to a
stationary distribution of the two types of projects.
1.2 Model
There are a large number of infinitely lived firms that produce a homogeneous
final good. Firms behave competitively, and there is no explicit entry or exit. Firms
are all-equity financed, hence firm value is equal to the market value of its equity.
5A concrete example is Harley-Davidson Inc. In April 2009, the midst of the Great Recession,
Harley-Davidson launched a comprehensive restructuring after demand for its products plummeted.
The restructuring resulted in layoffs of more than 2,000 staff and production workers as well as
investments in cutting-edge manufacturing equipment such as automated guided carriers. After the
restructuring, the company’s unlevered equity beta increased from 1.08 in the three years prior to
the Great Recession (2005-2007) to 1.49 in the three years after the recession (2010-2012).
6Hence, firm value can be decomposed into three components: the value of growth opportunities
for undertaking new projects, the value of existing unautomated projects, and the value of existing
automated projects.
7This argument is consistent with Berger (2012), who argues that firms grow “fat” during booms




Each firm owns a finite number of individual projects. Firms create projects
over time through investment, and projects expire randomly.8 The cash flows gener-
ated by project j of firm i at time t are given by
Ai,j,t = e
xt+zi,t+εj,t , (1.1)
where xt is the aggregate shock that affects the cash flows of all existing projects, and
zi,t and εj,t are the firm-specific shock and the project-specific shock, respectively.
While aggregate uncertainty contributes to the aggregate risk premium, the firm-
and project-specific shocks contributes to firm heterogeneity in the model. Simi-
lar to Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), I assume that shocks evolve according to
mean-reverting processes to capture their path-dependency property. Different from
Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), I assume that the rate of mean-reversion are the
same for all levels of shocks for tractability. Specifically,
dxt = −θxtdt+ σxdBxt
dzi,t = −θzi,tdt+ σzdBzt
dεj,t = −θεj,tdt+ σεdBεt,
(1.2)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of mean-reversion and Bxt, Bzt, and Bεt are Wiener
processes independent of each other. Hence, the dynamics of ai,j,t = log(Ai,j,t) evolve
8Firms with no existing projects can be viewed as firms waiting to enter the product market. In
this sense, my model endogenously takes into account the entry and exit of firms.
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according to







ε and Bt = (σxBxt + σzBzt + σεBεt)/σa, which is also a
Wiener process. In the following analysis, I suppress the firm index i and project
index j for notational simplicity unless otherwise indicated.
A project is characterized as follows. First, each project requires an initial
investment of I at the project’s initiation date. Second, each project requires fixed
units of non-routine-task labor such as managers to perform the non-routine tasks,
which demands a total wage of cN per unit of time. Finally, each project also requires
factor input to perform routine tasks, and the project generates cash flows when both
non-routine tasks and routine tasks are performed.
A project’s routine tasks can be performed by either fixed units of routine-
task labor or fixed units of machines. If the firm hires routine-task labor, it pays
a total wage of cR per unit of time, and the project starts producing immediately.
Production incurs a fixed cost of f per unit of time. I refer to projects using routine-
task labor as unautomated projects. If the firm invests in machines, the firm pays IM
at the initiation date, but it takes the firm T units of time to adapt the technology
embodied in the machines for its project, during which time the project does not
generate any cash flows.9 After the first T periods, the project starts generating cash
flows and incurs a fixed cost of f per unit of time. Using machines does not incur
9I assume that projects have heterogeneous needs for technology. Hence, each project requires
some time to customize the technology for its own needs.
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additional fixed costs.10 I refer to projects using machines as automated projects. All
capital, once purchased, has zero resale value.
Given the above setup, the operating profits for an unautomated project are
πU(t) = At − cR − cN − f, (1.4)
and the operating profits for an automated project initiated at time t0 are
πA(t0; t) =
{
−cN t ≤ t0 + T (technology-adoption periods)
At − cN − f t > t0 + T (production periods).
(1.5)
Firm Dynamics
Given that each project uses a fixed amount of input factors, changes in a
firm’s capital and labor in the model are represented by changes in the number of the
firm’s unautomated and automated projects. Such changes are assumed to arise for
one of three reasons. First, at any point of time, projects can expire independently
at a rate of δ. Second, following Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014), a new project
can exogenously become available to the firm according to a Poisson process with an
arrival rate of λ. At the time of arrival, the project-specific shock of the new project
is at its long-run average value, that is εt = 0. Such investment opportunities cannot
be postponed or preserved. If the firm decides to undertake the new project, it can
choose to initiate either an unautomated or an automated project.
10Alternatively, we can allow for a fixed cost of using machines, but regard the cost as part of f .
In this case, cR is the excess cost of using routine-task labor to using machines.
10
Third, a firm can endogenously switch its existing projects’ type at any time.
If the firm decides to switch a project from unautomated to automated, it lays off the
project’s routine-task labor and invests IM in machines. I assume that technology has
evolved to a stage such that automating unautomated projects is profitable. That is,
I assume that IM is significantly lower than the present value of all future wages paid
to routine-task labor, IM  cRr+δ .
11 For simplicity, I assume that the process of the
project-specific shock is not affected after a project’s type is switched. Given that
machines have zero resale value and routine-task labor is significantly more costly
than machines, switching from automated projects to unautomated projects is never
optimal.12
A firm’s existing projects are the sum of its unautomated projects and its
automated projects. Suppose at time t that a firm has nU,t unautomated projects
and nA,t automated projects. Then, the firm’s share of routine-task labor (RShare)






11The literature on investment-specific technological shocks argues that a large part of the tech-
nological progress after World War II took place in equipment and software and can be inferred
from the decline in the quality-adjusted price of new capital goods. See Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (1997), Papanikolaou (2011), and Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) for more details.
12I do not allow the firm to switch an automated project to a new automated project to ensure
that the general assumption applies to both unautomated and automated projects that the firm
cannot endogenously suspend production for purposes other than adopting labor-saving technology.
Technically, I assume that if the firm switches an automated project to a new automated project,
the firm does not need to take another T periods to learn the technology for the project, and the




Following Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Zhang (2005), I specify the
stochastic discount factor explicitly as
dΛt
Λt
= −rdt− σΛdBxt, (1.7)
where r is the interest rate and σΛ is the price of risk.
The Value of Automated Projects
Since automated projects do not have any options, their value is simply the
discounted value of their future profits. For an automated project initiated at t0,


















where t′ = max(t0 + T − t, 0) is the time to wait (for the project to generate cash














The Value of Unautomated Projects
The value of an unautomated project can be divided into the value of assets
in place, V APU (t), and the value of switching options, V SOU (t):
VU(t) = V
AP




The value of assets in place is simply the discounted value of future profits:

















The value of the switching option can be calculated as the discounted value
of the optimal payoff:
V SOU (t) = Payoff(t+ τ)Êt[e−(r+δ)τ ], (1.11)
where τ is the optimal stopping time for the firm to switch technology and Êt[·]
is an expectation operator under the risk-neutral probability measure. The payoff
function is
Payoff(t) = VA(t; t)− V APU (t)− IM
=











Hence, the switching option can be viewed as an investment opportunity with
a fixed benefit, a fixed direct cost, but a variable opportunity cost that is low if the
project is doing poorly. Following Dixit and Pindyck (1994), I prove the following in
Appendix A.1.2.
Proposition 1. (Optimal exercise of switching options): A firm optimally switches
a project from unautomated to automated when the project’s cash flows, At, are below
a threshold A∗, where A∗ satisfies
d [P (A∗)O(At, A
∗)]
dA∗
= 0 ∀At ≥ A∗, (1.13)
where O(At, A∗) = Êt[e−(r+δ)τ ] is the optimal discounting of the option payoff.
13
The analytical expression of O(At, A∗) is provided in Appendix A.1.2.
Corollary 1. (Cross-section of investment for technology switching): Keeping all
else equal, a firm with a high RShare invests more in machines than a firm with a
low RShare if the economy experiences a negative shock, that is, dxt < 0.13
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. (Cross-section of routine-task employment under negative aggregate
shocks): Keeping all else equal, a firm with a high RShare reduces more of their
routine-task labor than a firm with a low RShare if the economy experiences a negative
shock, that is, dxt < 0.
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 1.







g(s)ds− cR + cN + f
r + δ
+ P (A∗)O(At, A
∗). (1.14)
The Value of Growth Opportunities
Given that the investment opportunities cannot be postponed, firms optimally
decide to undertake new projects based on the NPV rule. The optimal exercise
of the growth options is thus characterized by comparing the incremental value of
13“Keeping all else equal” in this corollary means that we are comparing two firms with the same
number of projects and the same set of cash flows for their projects. The only difference is that the
high-RShare firm has more unautomated projects than the other firm.
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undertaking a new unautomated project, VU(t+ s)−I, undertaking a new automated
project, VA(t+ s; t+ s)− IM − I, and not undertaking a project.
The optimal exercise of switching options indicates that firms prefer un-
dertaking new automated projects over undertaking new unautomated projects if
At < A
∗.14 Let A∗∗ be the threshold for firms to undertake a new project. A∗∗ is
determined by making the investment in the new project a zero NPV project, that
is, A∗∗ is the solution to
VA(t; t)− IM − I = 0 (1.15)
or the solution to
VU(t)− I = 0. (1.16)
I summarizes these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Optimal exercise of growth options): A firm optimally undertakes
a new project when the cash flows of the new project, At = ext+zt+0, are above a
threshold A∗∗. A∗∗ is the minimum of the solutions to equations (1.15) and (1.16).
If A∗∗ < A∗, firms undertake an automated project when A∗∗ < At ≤ A∗ and
undertake an unautomated project when At > A∗.
If A∗∗ ≥ A∗, firms undertake an unautomated project when At > A∗∗.
Corollary 3. (Procyclical aggregate investment): All firms are more likely to invest
in new projects if the economy experiences a positive shock, that is, dxt > 0.
14To see this, suppose that a firm undertakes a new unautomated project when At < A∗. Then,
by Proposition 1, the firm will immediately switch the project to automated.
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Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 2.
This corollary helps to generate procyclical aggregate investment in the model.
Corollary 4. (Cross-section of investment for growth): If A∗∗ < A∗, conditional on
undertaking new projects, firms with high idiosyncratic shocks, zt, are more likely
to undertake new unautomated projects, and firms with low idiosyncratic shocks are
more likely to undertake new automated projects.
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 2.
The intuition of this corollary is straightforward. Because new unautomated
projects can start generating cash flows more quickly than new automated projects,
they are preferable to be undertaken for expansions when firms are doing well.15
This corollary has two implications in the model. First, it helps generate a sta-
tionary distribution of the two types of projects, since in equilibrium, while existing
unautomated projects are switched to automated ones, new unautomated projects
are also undertaken.
Second, this corollary also generates predictions in the cross-section of ma-
chinery investment in good times. Because high-RShare firms, on average, are more
likely to have high firm-specific shocks, they are more likely to hire routine-task labor
instead of investing in machines during good times than low-RShare firms.
Corollary 5. (Cross-section of routine-task employment under positive aggregate
shocks): If A∗∗ < A∗, keeping all else equal, a firm with a high RShare and a
15This argument is consistent with Berger (2012), who argues that firms grow “fat” during booms
and streamline their production during recessions.
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high firm-level shock is more likely to hire routine-task labor than a firm with a low
RShare and a low firm-level shock if the economy experiences a positive shock, that
is, dx > 0.
Given that the project-specific shock of any new project is at its long-term
mean, the present value of growth opportunities is a function of the aggregate shock
and the firm-specific shock:










At any time t, a firm may have nU,t unautomated projects and nA,t automated
projects that the firm previously undertook. Let VU,l(t) denote the value of the lth
unautomated project that the firm undertook, where l = 1, 2, ..., nU,t. Let tk ≤ t
denote the time when the kth automated project was undertaken, and VA,k(tk; t) the
value of the kth automated project, where k = 1, 2, ..., nA,t. Firm value equals the







VA,k(tk; t) + PV GO(t) (1.18)
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1.2.3 Firm Risk
The equity beta of a project or a firm is defined as the scaled covariance of














From equation (1.18), we know that a firm’s beta is the weighted average of the betas















To understand the connection between a firm’s RShare and its beta, I examine
the riskiness of the two types of projects.
I first compare betas of an unautomated project and an automated project
with the same set of shocks {xt, zt, εt}. The assets in place component of the unau-
tomated project is riskier than the automated project due to the higher operating
leverage induced by the fixed cost paid to routine-task labor. The switching op-
tion, which has a negative beta, lowers the beta of the unautomated project, making
comparison of the two types of projects difficult.
From equation (1.12), we see that when the project’s cash flows At approach
A∗, the value of the unautomated project approaches the value of a newly initiated
automated project minus the cost of investment in machines IM , that is,
lim
At→A∗+
VU(t) = VA(t; t)− IM . (1.21)
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Under mild parameter restrictions provided in Appendix A.1.3, a newly initiated
automated project is likely to be less risky than a goods-producing automated project
for a given set of shocks, because skipping T periods of production makes the project
value less sensitive to aggregate shocks. In this case, an unautomated project is less
risky than an automated project with the same set of shocks.
When the project’s cash flows At approach infinity, the switching option is
far out of the money and the value of an unautomated project approaches the value






Given that the assets in place of the unautomated project is riskier than
the goods-producing automated project, the unautomated project is riskier if At
approaches infinity. Putting these results together, I prove the following in Appendix
A.1.3:
Proposition 3. (Comparison of project risks): If the condition in Appendix A.1.3
holds, there exists a threshold of cash flows Ā(t0) ∈ (A∗,+∞) such that an automated
project initiated at time t0 is riskier than an unautomated project with the same set
of shocks {xt, zt, εt} when At < Ā(t0).
The equation that determines Ā(t0) is provided in Appendix A.1.3.
Figure 1.1 provides an example that illustrates the point in Proposition 3.
I first assign values to the parameters as in Table A.1.16 The figure illustrates the
16Appendix A.2 provides details on choosing the parameter values in Table A.1.
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pattern of βU and βA conditional on each aggregate productivity. As we can see,
while At increases, βU becomes closer to βA and ultimately becomes larger than βA,
suggesting that the hedging effect of switching options diminish as V SO approaches
zero, and the operating leverage effect becoming dominating. In this example, we
have Ā = 2.3 which is more than one standard deviation above the mean 1.
1.3 Conclusion
Technology continuously changes the way our economy produces. With the
arrival of new technology, some human skills are upvalued by better tools, while other
skills become redundant and are ultimately replaced by new tools. The adoption
of new technology to save labor cost often represents an important way for firms
to improve efficiency. However, firms do not always adopt new technology upon its
arrival. In deed, as I show in this paper, firms tend to wait until economic downturns
to adopt labor-saving technology. This link between technology adoption and the
business cycle provides a previously unexplored source of systematic risk and has
important implications for the cross-section of stock returns.
To illustrate this point, I develop a dynamic model that shows that a firm’s
option to replace routine-task labor with machines reduces the firm’s sensitivity to
unfavorable macroeconomic shocks and thus lowers its exposure to systematic risk.
The key insight of my model is that adopting machines takes time, as the firm needs
to adapt the technology embodied in the machines to its own projects. During this
technology adoption period, the projects’ production is interrupted. Hence, it is less
20
costly for the firm to launch labor-technology substitution in bad times than in good
times. As a result, in the cross-section, firms with more routine-task labor have more
opportunities to improve their value in bad times and thus have lower exposure to
systematic risk.
21


























Figure 1.1 Comparison of Project Betas: An Example
This figure compares betas between an automated project and an unautomated
project. The two projects share the same processes of aggregate productivity shock
xt, firm-specific productivity shock zt, and project-specific productivity shock εt.
Their betas are plotted in the neighborhood of the mean of aggregate productivity
ext , i.e., ext ∈ [0.8, 3.0]. The parameters are given in Table A.1. To calculate the
project beta for each productivity xt, I set the initial productivity to be At = ext ,
and simulate 100,000 times for any randomly generated At+1 following equation (1.3).




Implications for Asset Pricing
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I explore the asset pricing implications of labor-technology substitu-
tion. Specifically, I examine whether the option for a firm to replace routine-task
labor with machines is a source of macroeconomic risk that is priced in the cross-
section of stock returns. I document that firms with a high share of routine-task labor
have 3.1% lower stock returns per year than their industry peers with a low share.
The key insight of my explanation hinges on that replacing routine-task labor with
machines interrupts production. Firms thus optimally undertake such replacement
when productivity is low. Hence, if the economy experiences a negative shock, firms
with more routine-task labor can better improve their value through undertaking the
replacement, making them less exposed to systematic risk. In line with this insight,
I find that in response to an unfavorable GDP shock, firms with a high share of
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routine-task labor reduce investment in machines less than their industry peers but
increase layoffs of their routine-task labor more than their industry peers.
To study the empirical relation between routine-task labor and the cross-
section of stock returns, I construct a new measure of share of routine-task labor
(RShare) at the firm level using microdata from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The OES microdata
provide occupational employment and wages for 1.2 million establishments in the
U.S. over three-year cycles, covering 62% of total national employment. Following
the labor economics literature, I first assign to each occupation a routine-task in-
tensity score, which is calculated based on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.1 I
then sort all workers in each year by their occupations’ routine-task intensity scores
and classify the workers that fall in the top quintile of the distribution as routine-
task labor. By classifying routine-task labor each year, this measure accounts for
technological evolution. In particular, it accounts for the fact that certain previously
non-substitutable occupations become substitutable by machines over time. A firm’s
RShare is given as the ratio of the total wages paid to its routine-task labor relative
to its total wage expense. I rank firms based on their RShare relative to their in-
dustry peers, since different industries’ production technologies may require different
intensities of routine-task input to non-routine-task input.
My measure of firms’ share of routine-task labor is correlated with a number
1See, for example, Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Ace-
moglu and Autor (2011), Philippon and Reshef (2013), Autor and Dorn (2013), Autor, Dorn, and
Hanson (2013), and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015).
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of firm characteristics in a manner that is consistent with my model. In the data,
high-RShare firms have significantly lower ratios of machines to capital and machines
to routine-task labor than their industry peers with low RShare. These relations are
consistent with the model assumption that routine-task labor and machines are sub-
stitutes. High-RShare firms also have higher operating leverage, which is consistent
with the model assumption that routine-task labor is more costly to use than ma-
chines.2 Finally, High-RShare firms have higher cash flows. This is consistent with
the model implication that firms that experience higher cash flows are less likely to
replace their routine-task labor with machines.
The main empirical findings in this paper are twofold. First, I find that, in
response to unfavorable aggregate shocks, high-RShare firms replace more of their
routine-task labor with machines than do low-RShare firms. Specifically, I find that
high-RShare firms reduce both routine-task labor and RShare in their establish-
ments more than their industry peers do when GDP growth is low.3 The reduc-
tion in RShare for high-RShare firms’ establishments suggests that high-RShare
firms not only downsize their production in bad times, but also change their pro-
duction structure through the bad times. I control for state-year fixed effects in
these establishment-level tests. Hence, state labor protection laws, such as wrongful-
discharge laws, or state unionization laws, such as right-to-work laws, do not seem
2The operating leverage channel predicts that firms with a high share of routine-task labor have
higher exposure to systematic risk. In Chapter 1, I simulate the model with economically sensible
parameters and find that the switching options channel dominates the operating leverage channel
in predicting expected returns.
3I conduct this test at the establishment level instead of the firm level due to data limitations.
See Section 2.3 for more details.
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to drive the results. In addition, even though aggregate investment is procyclical,
I find that in the cross-section, high-RShare firms reduce investment in machines
significantly less than their industry peers when GDP growth is negative. Together,
these results support the model’s channel that high-RShare firms have more switch-
ing options to hedge against unfavorable aggregate shocks than low-RShare firms.
To further support the relation between machines and routine-task labor, I run a
placebo test in which I examine investment in capital other than machines. I do
not find that high-RShare firms respond to GDP shocks differently than low-RShare
firms in terms of investment in other capital.
Second, I find strong negative relations between firms’ RShare and their ex-
posure to systematic risk and expected returns. I investigate the market betas from
both the conditional and unconditional specifications of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM). I find that sorting portfolios of firms by RShare within industry
generates a monotonically decreasing pattern in both conditional and unconditional
market betas. The betas of the high-RShare quintile portfolio are more than 20%
lower than those of the low-RShare quintile portfolio in both the conditional and
unconditional CAPMs. I further examine expected returns and alphas of the five
portfolios and find a monotonically decreasing pattern in average excess returns but
no relation between alphas and RShare quintiles, indicating that excess returns are
explained by market betas. Comparing the high and low RShare quintile portfo-
lios yields a negative return spread of −3.1% per year.4 This low risk premia for
4Sorting based on RShare across all firms, instead of within industry, generates more than −4.8%
return spread per year. See the Internet Appendix for more details.
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high-RShare firms is a robust feature of the data. Using both panel regressions and
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth (1973)), I show that
RShare consistently and negatively predicts firms’ conditional betas (Lewellen and
Nagel (2006)) and future excess returns after controlling for known predictors of firm
risk and returns. In particular, the results are robust to controlling for firms’ oper-
ating leverage and cash flows, which are closely related to RShare but less related to
switching options in my model.
To check the robustness of the results that RShare predicts firm risk through
the switching options channel, I examine changes in firms’ switching options and
systematic risk after recessions. My model suggests that after a significant negative
aggregate shock, high-RShare firms exercise more of their switching options, making
them similar to low-RShare firms in terms of both their production structures and
their systematic risk. I confirm this prediction by showing that in the three years after
the beginning of the 2001 and 2008-09 recessions, firms with high and low RShare
prior to the recessions become more similar in terms of both machine-to-employment
ratio and operating leverage. In addition, the difference between their market betas
is no longer significant. These results support the view that high-RShare firms have
lower exposure to systematic risk because they have more switching options.
Finally, I examine additional predictions of the model to provide supporting
evidence on the substitutability of routine-task labor by machines. Comparative
statics in my model suggests that a negative shock to machine prices will make firms
more willing to replace their routine-task labor with machines. I explore an unan-
ticipated law introduced in October 2001, namely, the Job Creation and Worker
28
Assistance (JCWA) Act of 2002, which offers a 30% temporary tax bonus on cor-
porate investment in equipment. Using the Act as an equivalent negative shock to
machine prices, I conduct a simple counterfactual experiment by asking what would
have happened to the employment of high-routine occupations if the JCWA Act had
not been introduced. Consistent with my model’s prediction, I find the JCWA Act
led to a 0.3 million job loss in high-routine occupations from October 2001 to October
2002 but no effect on low-routine occupations.
2.2 Measuring a Firm’s Routine-Task Labor
2.2.1 Data and Methodology
My model suggests that a firm’s RShare can be measured as the ratio of
the total wages paid to its routine-task labor relative to its total wage expense (see
equation (1.6)). In this section, I describe the data and methodology that I use to
construct firms’ RShare.
I construct RShare as follows. First, I decompose each firm’s labor cost by
its employees’ occupations. Second, I identify the occupations in each year that can
be regarded as routine-task labor. With these two steps complete, I construct firms’
RShare following the definition in equation (1.6).
To obtain firms’ occupational composition, I use microdata at the establishment-
occupation level provided by the OES program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). This dataset covers surveys that track employment by occupations in approx-
imately 200,000 establishments every six months over three-year cycles from 1988 to
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2014. These data represent on average 62% of the non-farm employment in the U.S.
The data use the OES taxonomy occupational classification with 828 detailed occu-
pation definitions before 1999, and the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC)
with 896 detailed occupation definitions thereafter. Beyond occupational informa-
tion, the microdata also cover establishments’ location and industry affiliation, as
well as their parent company’s employer identification number (EIN), legal name,
and trade name.
The OES microdata include estimates of the median hourly wage for each
occupation in each establishment from 1997 onwards. For years before 1997, I esti-
mate the hourly wage from the Census Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing
Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) obtained from the website of National Bureau of
Economic Research. From the CPS-MORG, I calculate the hourly wage for 504 oc-
cupations in 13 broad industries.5 When possible, I impute the hourly wage for each
occupation-industry in the OES microdata. Otherwise, I use either the estimated
nationwide hourly wage for the OES occupation or the industry-level hourly wage
for the major group of the OES occupation. The total wages paid to an occupation
in an establishment is simply the product of the employment and the hourly wage.
5CPS-MORG uses the Census Occupation Codes (COC) to classify its occupations and the
Census Industry Codes (CIC) to classify its industries. I calculate the average hourly wage of
individuals aged 18 to 65 within each COC and broad CIC group, weighted by the personal earnings
weights. I build a crosswalk between COC and OES occupational classifications by first linking
both codes to a much more detailed occupational classification from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles and then assigning a COC occupation to an OES occupation if the COC occupation overlaps
with more than 50% the OES occupation’s detailed occupation. Similarly, I crosswalk COC to the
major groups of OES occupations. I also crosswalk CIC broad industry groups to 3-digit Standard
Industry Classifications, which is the industry classification used in the OES microdata.
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I aggregate establishments to Compustat firms using EINs and supplement the
matching by using legal names.6 The OES program started keeping the parent firm’s
EIN for establishments after 1999. For the sample between 1990 and 1999, I backout
the EIN information by linking the OES establishments through the BLS’s internal
identifiers to the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) database,
which has the EIN for the universe of establishments over the 1990 to 2014 period.
For the OES sample in 1988 and 1989, I match the establishments to Compstat
firms using legal names as no EINs are available. A firm’s labor composition at year
t is captured by the occupation composition for all employees the firm hires in its
establishments in years t− 2, t− 1, and t.7 This procedure identifies the occupation
composition in terms of labor cost for an average of 3857 Compustat firms in each
year from 1990 to 2014.
I next identify routine-task labor in the economy so that I can calculate firms’
RShare. My methodology is based on a procedure commonly used in the labor
economic literature and is closest to Autor and Dorn (2013). Specifically, I use
6Some states allow establishments that use professional payroll firms to report the payroll firms’
EINs instead of the establishment owners’ EINs. I hand-collect the legal names and EINs of
professional payroll firms and exclude establishments with legal names or EINs that match the
payroll firms. Another concern is that some firms may have multiple EINs, especially for large firms
that operate in multiple states. Failure to identify all EINs with common ownership would lead to
measurement error in RShare and increase the standard errors in my analysis. Supplementing the
matching using legal names improves the number of matches marginally, since the names are subject
to typing errors and missing information. In unreported analysis, I conduct a fuzzy matching via
legal names using stata ado file “reclink” written by Michael Blasnik. The resulting measure is very
close to the RShare measure.
7I include the establishments from the past two years because the OES survey covers each
establishment in 3-years cycles. This methodology provides better coverage of a firm’s operation
than using only firms’ establishments at year t.
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the revised fourth [1991] edition of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT) to obtain descriptions of occupations classified at a very
detailed level. For each DOT occupation, I select the occupation’s required skill
level in performing five categories of tasks: abstract analytic, abstract interactive,
routine cognitive, routine manual and non-routine manual tasks.8 I re-scale these
skill levels to values between 1 and 10. I then take the average of the abstract analytic
and abstract interactive skill levels as the skill level required by the occupation in
performing abstract tasks. Similarly, I take the average of the routine cognitive and
routine manual skill levels as the skill level required by the occupation in performing
routine tasks. Given that the revised edition of the DOT is available after 1991, to
avoid using future information, I employ a similar procedure using data from the
fourth [1977] edition of the DOT to create measures of the required skill level in
performing abstract, routine, and non-routine manual tasks for occupations before
1991.
I crosswalk the 1977 DOT occupations to the OES occupations for the 1988
to 1990 period and crosswalk the 1991 DOT occupations to the OES occupations
for the 1991 to 2014 period. The task skill measures for the OES occupations are
the average of the skill measures for the corresponding DOT occupations following
a weighting approach proposed by Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).9
8Specifically, abstract analytic skill is measured by mathematical skill. Abstract interactive skill
is measured by direction, control, and planning skills. Routine cognitive skill is measured by skills
in setting limits, tolerances, or standards. Routine manual skill is measured by finger dexterity.
Non-routine manual skill is measured by eye-hand-foot coordination skill.
9The DOT occupational classification is much finer than the OES taxonomy classification or the
SOC. Thus, the crosswalk from DOT to OES occupations is a simple aggregation. Following Autor,
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Following Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), I
define the routine-task intensity (RTI) score for each OES occupation as
RTIk = ln(T
Routine
k )− ln(TAbstractk )− ln(TManualk ), (2.1)
where TRoutinek , TAbstractk , and TManualk are the routine, abstract, and non-routine man-
ual task skill levels required by occupation k, respectively.
Routine-task labor is defined as follows. In each year, I select all workers in
the OES sample in the current year as well as the previous two years to represent
the current year’s labor force. I then sort all workers in the selected sample by their
occupations’ RTI scores. I define workers as routine-task labor if their RTI scores
fall in the top quintile of the distribution for that year.10










× empj,k,t × wagej,k,t∑
k empj,k,t × wagej,k,t
, (2.2)
where 1[·] is the index function, RTIk is the RTI score of occupation k, RTIP80t is
the 80 percentile of RTI scores for the labor force at time t, and empj,k,t and wagej,k,t
Levy, and Murnane (2003), I use the April 1971 CPS sample to obtain the employment weights of
the 1977 DOT occupations in the population. DOT occupations that do not appear in the April
1971 CPS sample is assigned with minimal population (i.e. one person) in the employment weights
calculation. I use the crosswalk of 1977 DOT to 1991 DOT occupations provided by David Autor
to obtain population weights for the 1991 DOT occupations. I aggregate the task skill levels from
DOT to OES occupations using the employment weights.
10In the Internet Appendix, I classify routine-task labor at alternative cutoffs, such as the top
quartile of the RTI score distribution, and find very similar results in all of the main tests. The
OES survey changed design in 1996, making it difficult to represent the total labor force. I thus use
the 1995 definition of routine-task labor to proxy for the total labor force in 1996. The definition
of routine-task labor for 1997 is based on the sorting of workers in the 1996 and 1997 samples.
33
are the number of employees and the hourly wages of occupation k in firm j at time
t, respectively.
I finalize my sample selection by imposing additional requirements based
firms’ accounting and stock return information. Appendix B.1 provides a detailed
description of the sample selection as well as definitions of financial and accounting
variables. I end up with 47,684 firm-year observations in 17 industries based on the
Fama and French (1997) classification.
2.2.2 Validation
Characteristics of Routine-Task Labor
To evaluate my measure of routine-task labor, I examine the characteristics
of occupations identified as routine-task labor. Panel A of Table 2.1 shows that
while routine-task labor accounts for a large portion of the clerical, production, and
sales occupations, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Jaimovich and Siu
(2014)), it also accounts for a significant portion of the service, professional, and
agriculture occupations.
Routine-task labor can potentially be misinterpreted as occupations that can
be outsourced to foreign countries such as China and India. If they are indeed the
same, routine-task labor should primarily capture the occupation’s substitutability
by remote but low-cost labor instead of substitutability by machines. Blinder (2009)
and Blinder and Krueger (2013) argue that essentially any job that does not need to
be done in person can ultimately be outsourced, regardless of whether it is routine or
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non-routine. Using the offshorability measure of occupations created by Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), I find supporting evidence. In particular, Panel B of Table 2.1
shows that offshorability has a small negative correlation with both the routine-task
labor dummy and the RTI score, indicating that these measures capture different
aspects of an occupation.
Many economists argue that jobs susceptible to technological substitution
tend to be those of middle-class workers with moderate skills. Consistent with this
argument, I find a moderate negative correlation of the routine measures and oc-
cupations’ median wages and skills. When I further examine whether routine-task
workers are more likely to be covered by labor unions, I find no significant correlation
between these two attributes, suggesting that unions are unlikely to be a major fac-
tor in hiring routine- versus non-routine-task labor.11 In summary, the above results
suggest that my measure of routine-task labor is consistent with the characteristics
of jobs that can be substituted by machines.
Employment over the Business Cycle
I examine routine-task labor by providing graphic evidence on the dynamics
of routine-task labor’s employment over the business cycle. Such evidence is helpful
for understanding firms’ decisions on hiring routine-task labor in different economic
11I obtain the union coverage rate for occupations from www.unionstats.com. This union coverage
rate is compiled by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson from the Current Population Survey and
updated annually. See Hirsch and MacPherson (2003) for a description of the database. The union
coverage rate is given at the COC classification. I crosswalk COC to SOC classification to obtain
the union coverage rate for the OES sample in 1999-2014.
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states, and for linking firms’ RShare and their exposure to systematic risk. While
my measure of routine-task labor, constructed based on the OES data, can be used
to capture the time-series impact of technological evolution in replacing labor, it is
not suitable for time-series analysis that requires tracking a given set of occupations
over time. Moreover, the OES data, based on surveys that cycle each establishment
every three years, cannot track changes in routine-task labor at the business cycle
frequency.
Conventional methods used in the labor economics literature is not helpful
either. A large body of this literature examines the time series of routine-task la-
bor’s employment and wages using data from the Census Bureau at the decennial
frequency. Such data are not suitable for employment dynamics over the business
cycle, which is traditionally defined at the 18- to 96-month frequency. Jaimovich and
Siu (2014), who classify routine-task labor based on three major occupation groups,
suggest that the CPS monthly sample is helpful for studying the business cycle. I
thus adopt a hybrid methodology whereby I define high-routine and low-routine oc-
cupations based on the distribution of RTI scores using the 1980 Census data, and
examine the business cycle dynamics of the two occupational groups using the CPS
monthly basic data.
Following Autor and Dorn (2013), I sort the labor force of the 1980 Census by
the RTI score of employees’ occupations, constructed using the 1977 DOT. I classify
occupations with RTI scores that fall in the top and bottom 30% of the distribution as
high-routine and low-routine occupations, respectively.12 In each month, I aggregate
12The occupations in the top 30% of the 1980 Census distribution closely matches my measure of
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workers in the CPS sample whose occupations belong to the high-routine or low-
routine occupations into two groups, weighted by the sampling weights. I track the
employment series of the two groups from January 1989 to December 2013.13
Figure 2.1 plots employment dynamics separately for high-routine occupa-
tions and low-routine occupations. Consistent with the literature, we see that the
employment of high-routine occupations declines over time, while the employment
of low-routine occupations rises. More importantly, the major decreases in the em-
ployment of high-routine occupations occur mostly during or shortly after economic
recessions. In contrast, the employment of high-routine occupations does not show a
significant trend during the expansionary periods. Put together, we see high-routine
jobs decline during recessions but do not bounce back during the recovery periods.
This supports my model’s prediction that firms replace routine-task labor with ma-
chines in bad times.
Wages and Machine Prices over the Business Cycle
I further examine the dynamics of wages and machine prices over the business
cycle to investigate possible alternative channels that link routine-task labor and
firms’ exposure to systematic risk but are not captured in my model. Specifically,
routine-task labor in 1990, which is defined as the top quintile of the 1990 OES distribution. Autor
and Dorn (2013) use the top 33% cutoff to identify routine-task labor.
13CPS occupation codes changed several times during my sample period. I crosswalk the occu-
pation codes of different years to a unified occupation classification occ1990, which is available at
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series maintained by the University of Minnesota. Due to a
major change in the CPS occupational classification in 1988, I construct the employment series of
high-routine and low-routine occupations starting from January 1989.
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if machine prices drop significantly in bad times, or if routine-task labor is more
willing to accept flexible wages than non-routine-task labor, high-RShare firms can
more easily reduce their labor costs in bad times than low-RShare firms. Both
channels can consequently lead to the negative relation between firms’ RShare and
their exposure to systematic risk, although the flexible wage channel cannot explain
the lack of recovery of routine-task labor after recessions.
Panel A of Figure 2.2 plots the quality-adjusted price of equipment from
Israelsen (2010) in 1989-2012. This price index is aggregated from the prices of
22 groups of durable equipment and is used in earlier studies as informative about
investment-specific technology shocks (see, for example, Kogan and Papanikolaou
(2014)). From the plot, we see that the price of machines declines smoothly over time
and does not exhibit sizable business cycle properties. In addition, following Kogan
and Papanikolaou (2014), I calculate the changes in the detrended log relative real
price of equipment to proxy for shocks to machine prices. I find that the correlation
between the machine price shocks and the real GDP growth is -25%, indicating that
machine prices do not move in the same direction as the aggregate economic states.
Panel B of Figure 2.2 plots the average hourly wages of high-routine oc-
cupations and low routine-occupations from 1989 to 2012 using the sample of the
CPS-MORG. The nominal hourly wage for each occupation is the average hourly
wage of individuals in that occupation and further aggregated to the high-routine
and low-routine group level, weighted by their personal earnings weights. Again, we
do not see sizable business cycle properties in the wages of high-routine occupations.
In addition, the correlation between the changes in the detrended log real wages for
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the high-routine and low-routine occupations and real GDP growth are 7% and 18%,
respectively. Hence, wages for routine-task labor are not more procyclical than wages
for non-routine-task labor.
In summary, the evidence mitigates the concern that my model does not take
into account the cyclicality of machine prices and wages.
Evidence from the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002
I provide more direct evidence on the substitution of routine-task labor by
machines by exploring an unanticipated law introduced in October 2001, namely,
the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWA Act). The JCWA Act
offers a 30% tax bonus on new qualified property, mostly machinery and equipment,
acquired by companies after September 10, 2001, and placed in to service before
September 11, 2004. Comparative statics in my model suggests that shocks that
lower machine prices will make firms more willing to replace their routine-task labor
with machines. Taking the tax bonus as a shock that lowers the price that firms pay
for machines, my model predicts that we should see an extra decline in routine-task
labor compared to the case without the shock.14 I conduct a simple counterfactual
experiment using the employment series of high-routine occupations constructed in
the previous section. Specifically, I ask what would have happened during and after
the 2001 recession if the JCWA Act had not been introduced in October 2001.
I match the employment series in the 1990 recession with those in the 2001
14Zwick and Mahon (2014) study JCWA Act and firm investment and find that firms respond to
the tax bonus by increasing more than 17% of their investments between 2001 and 2004.
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recession by pairing July 1990 with March 2001, the starting months of the two
recessions. I use the employment series of high-routine occupations and low-routine
occupations from October 2000 to October 2002 as the actual data, and use the series
from February 1989 to February 1991 as the counterfactual data.15 I then re-scale
the counterfactual series to match the magnitude of the decline in actual employment
from the starting month of the 2001 recession (March 2001) to the month in which
JCWA Act was introduced (October 2001).
Figure 2.3 presents the results. Consistent with my model’s prediction, we see
that employment of high-routine occupations dropped by an additional 0.9% within
one year after the introduction of the JCWA Act, while the counterfactual series in-
creased by 0.2% at the same time. The difference in percentage employment changes
between actual and counterfactual series converts to 0.3 million (1.1% × 29 million)
jobs lost in high-routine occupations in the one year after the introduction of JCWA
Act. The actual and counterfactual employment series of low-routine occupations,
however, do not show much difference.
2.3 Empirical Evidence
The model predicts that in response to unfavorable aggregate shocks, firms
with a high share of routine-task labor invest more in machines (Corollary 1) and
15The two series are further logged and band-pass filtered to remove fluctuations at frequencies
higher than 12 months. See Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) for details about band-pass filters,
and Jaimovich and Siu (2014) for a discussion on the advantages of using a band-pass filter in
non-quarterly data.
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reduce more of their routine-task labor (Corollary 2) than firms with a low share
of routine-task labor, and vice versa if the economy experiences favorable aggregate
shocks (Corollary 4 and 5). Due to the hedging channel against unfavorable aggre-
gate shocks, firms with a high share of routine-task labor have lower exposure to
systematic risk (Corollary 3). In this section, I empirically test these predictions.
2.3.1 Routine-Task Labor and Firm Characteristics
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the mean and standard deviation of firms’ RShare
and the number of firm-year observations in each industry sector. The results show
that routine-task labor is well-dispersed across industry sectors, with the retail and
manufacturing sectors having slightly more routine-task labor, on average. Hence,
RShare is not likely to be driven by a particular industry. Moreover, the standard
deviation of firms’ RShare is also large in each sector, providing statistical power to
my within-industry empirical tests.
I next examine how differences in firms’ RShare are related to other firm
characteristics. To do so, for each year, I sort firms in each Fama-French 17 industry
into five portfolios based on their RShare. I use within-industry sorting to mitigate
the concern that different industries’ production technologies may require different
intensities of routine-task input relative to non-routine-task input in practice, but
my model assumes the intensity to be fixed for all projects.
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that high-RShare firms have lower ratios of ma-
chine to assets and machine to routine-task labor, suggesting that these firms adopt
labor-saving technology to a lesser extent than low-RShare firms. Consistent with
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the argument that routine-task labor is more costly to use than machines, I find that
high-RShare firms have higher operating leverage. In addition, consistent with the
model prediction that firms maintain high RShare because they have not experienced
negative shocks to cash flows, I find that high-RShare firms have much higher cash
flows than low-RShare firms. I also find that high-RShare firms have larger size,
higher book-to-market, and higher financial leverage.
Finally, I examine whether routine-task labor is a persistent firm character-
istic. My model suggests that after exercising their switching options, high-RShare
firms reduce their RShare due to technology switching. To test this prediction, I
examine the transition probability of a firm changing from one RShare quintile in a
year, sorted within industry, to another RShare quintile in the next year. Panel C
of Table 2.2 shows that, on average, 24% to 40% of firms opt out of their current
quintile portfolio in the next year, implying that RShare is a relatively dynamic firm
characteristic.
2.3.2 Inspecting the Mechanism
My model suggests that high-RShare firms can replace routine-task labor
with machines to a greater extent than low-RShare firms in response to unfavorable
aggregate shocks. To test this prediction, I examine firms’ response to aggregate
shocks in terms of their investment in machines and their routine-task employment
conditioning on their RShare.
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Investment in Machines and Aggregate Shocks
Here, I show that high-RShare firms invest more in machines than low-RShare
firms when aggregate shocks are low. Investment in machines is measured by the
real annual growth in machinery and equipment at cost (Compustat item FATE)
from the property, establishment, and equipment section of a firm’s balance sheet.
The advantage of using an “at cost” measure is that it does not take into account
amortization and depreciation. Hence, any year-over-year change in this variable can
be attributed largely to firm investment or divestment. I use the growth in real GDP
value added as a proxy for aggregate shocks.16
In the first four columns of Table 2.3, I run the following panel regression:
IMf,t = b0 + b1RSharef,t−1 + b2RSharef,t−1× Shockt + cXf,t−1 + Ff + FInd×Y ear + εft,
(2.3)
where IMf,t is firm f ’s investment in machines in year t, RSharef,t−1 is the firm’s
RShare at the beginning of the year, Shockt is the aggregate shock in year t, Xf,t−1
is other firm characteristics that are known to predict investment, including the
logarithm of Tobin’s Q, market leverage, cash flows, cash holdings, and the logarithm
of total assets; and Ff and FInd×Y ear denote firm and industry-year fixed effects,
respectively.17
16Alternatively, we could use the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP) series provided by
the Federal Reserve Economic Data to proxy for aggregate shocks. The disadvantage of the TFP
series is that it is only available up to 2011.
17In the Internet Appendix, I also control for the cross-term of firm characteristics and the
aggregate shock for robustness check.
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The first two columns of Table 2.3 report results of regressions without and
with controls for firm characteristics using all sample years from 1990 to 2014. I find
negative and significant estimates for b2, implying that high-RShare firms indeed
invest more in machines than low-RShare firms in bad times.18 In response to a 2%
drop in real GDP growth, a firm with RShare one standard deviation higher than
its industry peers has machinery investment 0.4% higher.
One caveat is that the Job Creation and Worker Assistance (JCWA) Act
introduced at the end of the 2001 recession may have significant impact on the
machinery investment in high-RShare firms and low-RShare firms. If high-RShare
firms respond to the lowered machinery prices by investing more in machines than
low-RShare firms, one may be concerned that the results I obtained in the first two
columns of Table 2.3 are not driven by the aggregate shocks but instead by shocks to
machine prices. To mitigate this concern, I conduct the test by excluding the years
2002-2004 in Columns (3) and (4), when JCWA Act is active, and find my results
remain.
Another concern is that high-RShare firms may have less procyclical capital
investment than low-RShare firms due to factors not observed by economists. To
assess this possibility, I conduct a placebo test in which I run the same panel regres-
18Using GDP growth as aggregate shocks helps to examine my model predictions on machinery
investment in both good times and bad times. To focus on investment in bad times, I conduct a
difference-in-differences test using recessions as productivity shocks and analyze the high-RShare
and low-RShare firms’ investment in machines before and after the shocks in the Internet Appendix.
I find that the changes in high-RShare firms’ investment in machines are significantly more positive
than the changes in low-RShare firms’ investment in machines in 1 year, 2 years, or 3 years after
recessions.
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sion but examine investment in other capital rather than machines.19 The last two
columns of Table 2.3 report insignificant results on the cross term. Hence, we do not
see that high-RShare firms respond to aggregate shocks differently from low-RShare
firms in terms of investment in other capital.20 The different results across invest-
ment in machines and investment in other capital support the view that machines,
in contrast to other capital, are closely related to routine-task labor.
As shown in Chapter 1 that the main channel to link investment in machines
and firms existing RShare comes from switching in bad times. In other words, the
effect should be mainly captures by the downside of the economy instead of the
upside. However, the use of real GDP growth in Table 2.3 may indicate that the
predicting power actually comes from the upside. To isolate the predicting power
in downturns, I conduct a difference-in-differences test using the 2001 and 2007-08
recessions as proxy for negative productivity shocks.
Table 2.4 shows the results. Column (1) and (2) show the cumulative invest-
ment in machine rates in 1-year window; Column (3) and (4) show the cumulative
investment in machine rates in 2-year window; Column (5) and (6) show the cumu-
lative investment in machine rates in 3-year window. The results show supporting
19Other capital is the difference between property, plant, and equipment at cost (Compustat
item PPEGT) and machinery and equipment at cost (FATE). Investment in other capital is the
real growth rate of other capital.
20The fact that both the coefficients and the the standard errors are larger in the placebo test
is due to the reason that investment in other capital is more noisy. In the Internet Appendix, I
standardize all variables and conduct a more comprehensive placebo test by examining investment
in buildings, land, construction in progress, capital leases, research and development, and advertise-
ment. I find the coefficients for the cross-terms in the machinery investment regressions are both
economically and statistically more significant than the coefficients in the placebo tests.
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evidence that in one year, two years, or even three years after each of the recessions,
firms with high RShare prior the recessions increase their investment in machines
more than their industry peers. The univariate regressions (1), (3), and (5) show
that the economic magnitude goes down as the accumulating window expands, but
the statistics significance persists, if not stronger. The multivariate results show that
the effect is most pronounced in 2-year cumulative windows.21 This is evidence that
switching options are an important channel for firms’ investment policy on machines.
Routine-Task Employment and Aggregate Shocks
Here, I show that high-RShare firms lay off disproportionally more routine-
task labor than low-RShare firms when aggregate shock is low. Measuring changes
in routine-task labor at the firm level is difficult due to data limitations. Specifically,
given that the OES survey covers the same establishment every three years, a firm’s
routine-task labor in a given year is measured based on the firm’s establishments
that appear in the OES sample both in the current year and over the prior two
years. Hence, the year-over-year changes in a firm’s routine-task labor captures the
actual hiring and firing of routine-task labor in only one-third of its establishments,
since the firm’s routine-task labor in the current year and the following year are
constructed using the same OES observations in the overlapping periods.
To avoid the above concern, I conduct the analysis at the establishment level.
There are two advantages of using establishment-level data in this analysis. First,
21Appendix Table B.2 shows that the results are robust to interacting the treatment dummy with
other characteristics.
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doing so overcomes the overlapping-periods issue associated with a firm-level analysis.
Second, the establishment-level data provide more detailed information than the firm-
level data, such as establishments’ location, which is helpful for controlling for local
labor-market heterogeneity.
I construct three proxies of establishments’ change in routine-task employ-
ment. The first measure is the change in establishments’ routine-task employment
from three years before to the current year normalized by their total number of
employees three years before. The second measure is the change in establishments’
RShare constructed based on employment in each occupation instead of total wage
expense following equation (2.2) from three years before to the current year. The
third measure is the change in establishments’ RShare from three years before to the
current year. In constructing each of the three measures, routine-task labor both in
the current year and three years before is defined based on the RTI score distribution
in the economy three years before. Aggregate shocks in this analysis are defined as
the real growth in GDP value added from three years before to the current year.
Panel A of Table 2.5 reports the results of the following panel regression:
ChgRoutinee,f,t−3,t = b0 + b1RSharee(f),t−3 + b2RSharee(f),t−3 × Shockt−3,t
+ Ff + FInd×Y ear + FState×Y ear + εe,f,t,
(2.4)
where ChgRoutinee,f,t−3,t is one of the three proxies of the change in routine-task employment
in firm f ’s establishment e from year t− 3 to year t, RSharee(f),t−3 is the establish-
ment or its parent firm’s RShare in year t − 3, Shockt−3,t is the aggregate shock
from t − 3 to t, and Ff , FInd×Y ear, and FState×Y ear denote the firm, industry-year,
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and state-year fixed effects, respectively. While industry-year fixed effects control for
intrinsic production technology in terms of routine-task input and non-routine-task
input, state-year fixed effects control for the time-varying effect of local labor market
conditions, such as state labor laws, or fluctuations in local wages (see Tuzel and
Zhang (2015)).22
In Column (1) of Panel A in Table 2.5, we see that high-RShare firms are more
likely to reduce routine-task labor in their establishments than low-RShare firms
when aggregate shocks are low. Columns (3) and (5) further shows that reduction
in routine-task labor during bad times is disproportionally higher in establishments
of high-RShare firms than low-RShare firms. Hence, high-RShare firms respond to
unfavorable aggregate shocks by undertaking a structural change in their production
inputs that narrows their RShare gap with low-RShare firms.
It is possible that different establishments within a firm may have different
RShare. In addition, Giroud and Mueller (2015) show that firms reallocate capital
and labor among establishments within the firms when facing investment oppor-
tunities. To check whether firms are indeed replacing their routine-task labor in
high-RShare establishments, I use the establishment’s RShare in Columns (2), (4),
and (6) as the independent variable. I find that high-RShare establishments respond
to unfavorable macroeconomic shocks by reducing more routine-task labor and low-
ering both of their employment-based RShare and RShare. These results show that
22Examples of state labor laws that could affect firm decisions are wrongful-discharge laws (see
Serfling (2015)) and right-to-work laws (see Matsa (2010) and Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina
(2011)).
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my results are robust to within-firm resource reallocation.
These results, together with the previous results on firms’ investment in ma-
chines, support my model’s prediction that high-RShare firms have more switching
options to replace routine-task labor with machines when facing unfavorable aggre-
gate shocks.
My model suggests that in response to a favorable aggregate shock, high-
RShare firms are more likely to undertake new unautomated projects that increase
their establishments’ RShare. I test this prediction by examining the RShare of
newly opened establishments in high-RShare firms and low-RShare firms. An es-
tablishment is identified as newly opened in a given year if it does not exist in the
prior year of the QCEW data, which cover the universe of establishments in the U.S.
from 1990 to 2014.23
Panel B of Table 2.5 reports results of the following panel regression:
RShare
Est,(Emp)
e,f,t = b0 + b1RSharef,t−1 + b2RSharef,t−1 × Shockt
+ Ff + FInd×Y ear + FState×Y ear + εe,f,t,
(2.5)
where RShareEst,(Emp)e,f,t is the RShare or the employment-based RShare of estab-
lishments in year t, RSharef,t−1 is the RShare of the establishment’s parent firm’s
RShare in year t − 1, Shockt is the real growth rate of GDP value added in year
23QCEW draws establishment information from the unemployment insurance (UI) agency. Em-
ployers of new establishments are required by law to report to UI and pay unemployment taxes
if: (1) they pay wages to employees totaling $1,500 or more in any quarter of a calendar year,
or (2) they had at least one employee during any day of a week during 20 weeks in a cal-
endar year, regardless of whether or not the weeks were consecutive. For more details see
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uitaxtopic.asp
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t, and Ff , FInd×Y ear, and FState×Y ear denote the firm, industry-year, and state-year
fixed effects, respectively. The results show that a positive and significant estimation
of b2, implying that in response to favorable aggregate shocks, high-RShare firms are
more likely to hire routine-task labor in their new establishments than low-RShare
firms.
Substitution and Aggregate Shocks
The previous results present two pieces of evidence. First, in bad times, firms
with high a RShare cut their investment in machines less than their industry peers.
Second, in bad times, firms with a high RShare increase their layoffs of routine-
task labor more than their industry peers. Since these two pieces of evidenced are
drawn from two separate regressions, one concern is that whether the firms that cut
investment in machines less are the same firms that increase layoffs of routine-task
labor more. In other words, the concern is whether we have more direct evidence on
labor-technology substitution at the firm level.
In Panel A of Table 2.6, I conduct the following empirical test to provide
direct evidence on substitution at the firm level. The test asks that in bad times,
whether firms with a high RShare have a more negative (or less positive) correlation
than their industry peers with a low RShare. Note that because all firms have growth
options, employment and investment tend to be highly positively correlated for all
firms. Hence, even if labor-technology substitution predicts a negative correlation
between investment in machines and employment of routine-task labor, such negative
correlation is difficult to detect explicitly. Hence, the test in Table 2.6 explores
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the cross-sectional differences in this correlation between firms with a high and low
RShare. In particular, the model predicts that in bad times, since firms with a high
RShare can replace their routine-task labor with machines to a larger extent, they
have a much more negative (or less positive) correlation of investment in machines
and employment of routine-task labor than their industry peers. If the prediction is
correct, we expect to see a positive coefficient b5 in the following panel regression:
ChgRoutinee,f,t−3,t = b0 + b1RSharee(f),t−3 + b2RSharee(f),t−3 × Shockt−3,t
+ b3RSharee(f),t−3 × IMf,t−3,t
+ b4Shockt−3,t × IMf,t−3,t
+ b5RSharee(f),t−3 × IMf,t−3,t × Shockt−3,t
+ Ff + FInd×Y ear + FState×Y ear + εe,f,t,
(2.6)
where IMt−3,t is the three-year investment rate in machines at the firm level. Table
2.6 shows that the coefficient b5 is positive when examine all the three measures of
changes in establishments’ routine-task employment. These are direct evidence that
in bad times, high-RShare firms tend to replace routine-task labor with machines
to a larger extent than their industry peers.
As a placebo test, in Panel B of Table 2.6, I use investment in other capital
instead of investment in machines. I do not see significantly results in coefficient b5.
For instance, in Column (1), the coefficient is 0.080 which is statistically insignificant
and also economically much smaller than that in the main test (1.062).
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2.3.3 Asset Prices
My model implies that high-RShare firms have lower exposure to systematic
risk and expected returns. I test this implication below.
Portfolio Analysis
I explore firms’ stock returns using portfolio analysis. Specifically, at the end
of each June, firms in each Fama-French 17 industry are sorted into five equally
weighted portfolios based on their share of routine-task labor, RShare. From Panel
B of Table 2.2, RShare varies from 0.02 for the lowest quintile portfolio to 0.39 for
the highest quintile portfolio on average.
In Panel A of Table 2.7, I find that excess returns monotonically decrease
from the lowest RShare quintile to the highest RShare quintile, yielding an average
of −3.1% return spread per year. The Sharpe ratio for the long-short portfolio is
0.11, which is lower than that for anomalies that cannot be explained by market
risk, such as the value premium, which has a Sharpe ratio of 0.39 (see, for example,
Zhang (2005)).
My model assumes that firms are all-equity financed. In practice, firms may
also issue debt to finance their investment. If firms issue debt to finance their labor-
technology substitution, low-RShare firms are expected to have higher financial lever-
age and, in turn, higher returns. To address this concern, I first show in Panel B
of Table 2.2 that low-RShare firms have lower financial leverage than high-RShare
firms, on average. To further address potential time-varying financial leverage be-
52
tween low-RShare and high-RShare firms, I calculate firms’ unlevered returns fol-
lowing the simple approach by Donangelo (2014), and conduct the portfolio analysis
using the excess unlevered returns. The unlevered returns are calculated according
to





where RRawf,m,y is the monthly stock return of firm f in month m of year y, RFm,y is the
one-month Treasury bill rate in month m of year y, and Mkt.Levf,y−1 is the market
leverage ratio for firm f at the end of year y − 1.
Panel B of Table 2.7 reports the results of excess unlevered returns and the
two corresponding market betas for firms in five RShare portfolios sorted within
industry. Similar to the results using raw excess returns, the portfolio that longs the
highest RShare portfolio and shorts the lowest RShare portfolio observes negative
and significant return spreads, indicating that financial leverage is not driving the
main results.
In my model, firms’ RShare and other characteristics such as size and book-
to-market are interrelated. Hence, my model does not claim that RShare predicts
cross-sectional risk and returns after controlling for firms’ other characteristics. Nev-
ertheless, as a robustness check, I repeat the portfolio analysis using stock returns
adjusted for firm characteristics following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997) (DGTW). I construct the DGTW-adjusted returns by taking the difference
between stocks’ raw returns and the benchmark portfolio’s returns. The bench-
mark portfolio is constructed by sequentially sorting all common stocks in the CRSP
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universe into 125 portfolios based on size, industry-adjusted book-to-market, and
momentum (see Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) for more details).
Panel C shows that the relations between RShare and firms’ exposure to sys-
tematic risk and expected returns are robust to adjusting returns with the characteristics-
based benchmarks.
CAPM Betas
I explore firms’ exposure to systematic risk, proxied by unconditional and
conditional market betas under the CAPM framework. Table 2.8 shows that both of
the two market betas decrease monotonically with RShare. A portfolio that longs the
highest RShare portfolio and shorts the lowest RShare portfolio has an unconditional
market beta of −0.23 and a conditional beta of −0.29, both of which are highly
statistically significant. I do not find significant differences in alpha between the high-
RShare and low-RShare quintiles in either unconditional or conditional CAPM,
indicating that the excess returns are explained by market betas.24
Panel Regressions
In my model, other firm characteristics, most prominently operating leverage
and cash flows, are closely related to firms’ share of routine-task labor. At the
same time, each characteristic captures different firm attributes, with RShare most
24In the Internet Appendix, I decompose the market betas for each portfolio into cash flow betas
and discount rate betas following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and find that cash flow betas
account for slighter more than half of the market betas, providing supporting channels through
which market betas explain excess returns in my test.
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directly related to the value of firms’ switching options to replace routine-task labor
with machines. In this section, I control for these characteristics directly in panel
regressions as follows:
βCondf,t = b0 + b1RSharef,t−1 + b2Charf,t−1 + FInd×Y ear + εf,t
Rf,t −RFt = b0 + b1RSharef,t−1 + b2Charf,t−1 + FInd×Y ear + εf,t,
(2.8)
where βCondf,t is the conditional beta, constructed following Lewellen and Nagel (2006)
as the sum of the coefficients for the contemporaneous and lagged monthly market
returns when regressing firm f ’s monthly excess returns on them in year t (also see
Dimson (1979)), Rf,t−RFt is the annual excess return of firm f in year t, RSharef,t−1
is the share of routine-task labor of firm f in year t− 1, Charf,t−1 are the other firm
characteristics in year t− 1, and DInd×Y ear denotes the industry-year fixed effects.
High-RShare firms may have higher operating leverage than low-RShare
firms, given that routine-task labor is more costly to use than machines. This chan-
nel leads to a positive relation between RShare and firm risk, which goes against my
main channel and hence works against finding significant results. Table 2.9 shows
that RShare is a robust predictor of conditional beta (in Panel A) and future annual
excess returns (in Panel B) after controlling for operating leverage as constructed
following Novy-Marx (2011).
Cash flows affect firm risk in a more subtle way in my model. The fact
that high-RShare firms have automated fewer of their unautomated projects than
low-RShare firms indicates that high-RShare firms may have experienced higher
idiosyncratic shocks to their projects’ cash flows in the past. Given that the shocks
are persistent, these firms may be expected to keep earning higher cash flows in the
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future, making their value less sensitive to negative systematic shocks and thus less
risky. To address this alternative channel, I control for firms’ cash flows in the panel
regressions and find that RShare continues predict firms’ conditional beta and future
annual excess returns.
I also test the predictive power of RShare by controlling for firms’ market
leverage, size, and book-to-market; and I find that RShare persistently predicts firms’
conditional betas and annual excess returns. Controlling for all firm characteristics,
the results show that a one standard deviation decrease in RShare (16% in Table
2.2) increases a firm’s expected return by 1.4% (16% × 8.69%) per year. Finally, I
run the panel regression across all firms, instead of within industry, and find that
the coefficient for RShare becomes more economically significant compared to when
industry fixed effects are added. Hence, my results, based on the within-industry
analysis, provide a conservative estimation of the relation between RShare and firms’
systematic risk and expected returns.
In Table 2.10, I present my main return regression results under various as-
sumptions for the correlation structure of the residuals. In the first four columns, I
double-cluster the standard errors by year and firm following Petersen (2009). In the
last two columns, I run monthly cross-sectional regressions of future excess returns
on RShare, firm-level control variables, and with and without industry dummies;
and I report time series average of the coefficients (Fama and MacBeth (1973)). I
find that the results are robust to these alternative specifications.
In summary, the robustness tests above strengthen the interpretation of RShare
as a proxy for the value of firms’ options to replace routine-task labor with machines.
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Measurement Error in RShare
I further check whether the results are robust to measurement error inRShare.
A firm’s RShare is calculated based on the occupational composition of its estab-
lishments that have the same EIN as in the firm’s annual report. In practice, a
firm may have multiple EINs. Most of such cases occur when the firm operates in
multiple states and has different EINs for different states. The EINs in firms’ annual
reports are usually the EINs of the firms’ headquarters. Hence, my RShare measure
is likely to capture the labor composition for establishments in the states where the
firm’s headquarters is located. It is not obvious to see whether measurement error in
RShare due to this reason is likely to create a biased estimation of its stock return
predictability. However, measurement error, if it exists, is likely to attenuate the
significance of my estimation. I confirm these conjectures using subsample analysis.
In Panel A of Table 2.11, I examine the predictability of RShare on annual
stock returns in two subsamples. In one subsample, the ratio of firms’ total number of
employees, identified in the OES microdata, to that in the Compustat data is below
the median ratio of the year. In the other subsample, the ratio is above the median.
I do not find any sizable difference in the predictability of RShare on annual stock
returns in these two subsamples. The coefficient of RShare is −8.11 when using the
former subsample and −9.24 when using the latter subsample, both of which are very
close to the coefficient estimated using the full sample, −8.69. This result indicates
that measurement error, investigated without relating directly to firms’ geographic
dispersion, is not severe.
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Given that measurement error in RShare is likely to be more severe for firms
that operate across multiple states, I further investigate the predictability of RShare
on stock returns conditional on the dispersion of firms’ operation across states. Gar-
cia and Norli (2012) define firms as geographically focused if few state names are
mentioned in the firms’ annual reports. Garcia and Norli (2012) report that the
average state count for the firms in the highest geographical focus quintile is two.
I thus classify firms that mention two or fewer states in their annual reports as
geographically focused firms. Panel B shows that RShare indeed has a stronger
return predictability among geographically focused firms than among geographically
dispersed firms, suggesting that measurement error in RShare is less severe among
geographically focused firms. Nevertheless, the return predictability of RShare is
still highly significant among geographically dispersed firms.
In addition, Tuzel and Zhang (2015) examine establishment locations for over
2,000 public firms in 2014 using the ReferenceUSA data. They find that small firms
are much more geographically focused. Hence, I further divide my sample into two
groups based on whether the firm’s market capitalization is above or below the me-
dian of the year. I find that RShare predicts annual stock returns more significantly,
both economically and statistically, among small firms than among large firms. In
Panel C, the coefficient of RShare is −12.77 for small firms and −3.33 for large
firms. Hence, measurement error in RShare seems to be less severe among small
firms, which are likely to operate locally. This finding also indicates that the stock
return predictability of RShare is driven mostly by small firms.
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Option Exercise in Recessions
I further examine the connection between firms’ option to replace routine-task
labor with machines and their exposure to systematic risk by directly examining the
consequences of recessions. My model suggests that after a significant negative aggre-
gate shock, like the shocks that occurred during recessions, high-RShare firms replace
their routine-task labor with machines to a greater extent than do low-RShare firms.
Hence, after recessions, high-RShare firms exercise more of their switching options,
making them more similar to low-RShare firms in terms of both their production
structures and their market betas.
I confirm this prediction in Table 2.12. Using the 2001 and 2008-09 recessions,
I track the two groups of firms over the four years starting in the year prior to
each recession. Specifically, I sort firms in each Fama-French 17 industry into five
portfolios based on their RShare in the year prior to each recession (i.e., in 2000 or
2007) and hold the portfolio formation constant over the observation period. For
each portfolio, I track the ratio of machines to total employment, operating leverage,
as well as its market beta. Firms are required to have non-missing information over
all four years to avoid selection bias.
Table 2.12 shows that the differences between the machine-to-employment
ratio of the high-RShare firms and low-RShare firms narrow from 14 thousand dollars
per worker to 11 thousand dollars per worker and become statistically insignificant.
Consistent with the model assumption that routine-task labor is more costly to use
than machines, the gap in operating leverage between high-RShare and low-RShare
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firms narrows by more than 10% and becomes statistically insignificant.
More importantly, the market betas for the two groups of firms are much closer
to each other after recessions. This result is consistent with the model prediction that
high-RShare firms exercise their hedging options relatively more than low-RShare
firms, which narrows the differences in their exposure to systematic risk.
2.4 Conclusion
This paper present novel empirical evidence that supports the main predic-
tions of the model. Using detailed establishment-occupation level data, I calculate
the proportion of a firm’s total labor costs that can be potentially eliminated with
automation, namely, the share of routine-task labor, for publicly traded firms in the
U.S. I find that firms with a high share of routine-task labor respond to unfavorable
GDP shocks by investing more in machines and reducing more routine-task labor
than their industry peers. Moreover, these firms have significantly lower market
betas and future returns than their industry peers.
More generally, this research complements recent studies that explore how
technological shocks affect the cross-section of stock returns (see, for example, Gar-
leanu, Panageas, and Yu (2012), Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), and Kogan and
Papanikolaou (2014)). In particular, this paper suggests that firms’ decisions to
adopt technology are related to the business cycle. Accounting for this link between
technology adoption and the business cycle in the study of technological shocks and
stock returns would be an interesting direction for future work.
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Panel A presents the time-series average of the share of routine-task labor for aggregate
occupational groups using establishment-occupation level data provided by Occupational
Employment Statistics program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Routine-task labor
(RTL) is defined as workers in occupations with routine-task intensity scores in top quintile
of the distribution in that year. See Section 2.2 for the definition of routine-task intensity
score. Emp in 2014 is the total employment in millions as of the year 2014. The aggregate
occupational group is defined as the major group, following the OES Taxonomy classifi-
cation for the sample of 1990-1998. For the 1999-2014 sample, which uses the Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) classification for occupations, I aggregate the major SOC
classification to seven aggregate groups following the suggestions of the SOC Revision Pol-
icy Committee. Management represents managerial and administration occupations (SOC
11-13). Professional represents professional, paraprofessional, and technical occupations
(SOC 15-31). Sales represents sales-related occupations (SOC 41). Clerk presents cler-
ical, office and administrative support occupations (SOC 43). Service represents service
and related occupations (SOC 33-39). Agriculture represents farming, fishing, and forestry
occupations (SOC 45). Production represents production, maintenance, construction, and
transportation occupations (SOC 47-53). Panel B presents the time-series average of the
correlation between different characteristics of occupations. Routine-task labor is a dummy
variable that equals one if the occupation is routine-task labor during that year. RTI Score
is the routine-task intensity score of the occupation. Offshorability, created by Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), is the propensity of the occupation to be outsourced to foreign coun-
tries. Wage is the median hourly wage of the occupation. Skill is the Specific Vocational
Preparation measure from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which measures the oc-
cupation’s required level of specific preparation. Unionization is the percentage of workers
in the occupation covered by unions from www.unionstats.com. Panel B is prepared using
OES data from 1999-2014 under SOC classification.
Panel A: Routine-Task Labor in Occupation Groups
Management Professional Sales Clerk Service Agriculture Production Total
RTL (%) 0.2% 5.6% 22.2% 32.0% 36.1% 8.3% 20.4% 20.0%
Emp in 2014 4.96 11.42 7.84 4.39 7.47 0.16 9.23 45.46
Panel B: Average Correlation Matrix
Routine-Task Labor RTI Score Offshorability Wage Skill Unionization
Routine-Task Labor 1
RTI Score 0.65 1
Offshorability −0.02 −0.06 1
Wage −0.28 −0.35 0.12 1
Skill −0.27 −0.44 0.05 0.64 1
Unionization −0.05 −0.07 −0.25 0.00 −0.06 1
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Table 2.2
Summary Statistics of Firms
This table presents the summary statistics. Panel A reports the mean and standard devia-
tion of share of routine-task labor (RShare) for all matched Compustat firms by industrial
sectors from 1990 to 2014. RShare is the ratio of a firm’s total wage expense on its
routine-task labor to its total wage expense, as defined in equation (2.2). Sector is at the
SIC division level. Panel B reports the characteristics of firms sorted into five portfolios
based on their RShare within industry. Each year, firms in each of the Fama-French 17
industries are sorted into five portfolios based on their RShare. Mach/Capital is the ratio
of machinery and equipment at cost to capital at cost (i.e., machinery and equipment at
cost plus structures at cost). Mach/RTL is the ratio of machinery and equipment at cost
to total number of routine-task labor in the firm in million dollars per employee. Op.Lev
and CF represent firms’ operating leverage and cash flow, respectively. Size, B/M , and
Mkt.Lev represent the market capitalization, book-to-market, and financial leverage, re-
spectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level (0.5% in each tail of the distribution).
See the Appendix for definitions of firm-level variables. Panel C shows the year-over-year
transition probability matrix of a firm moving from one RShare quintile to another. RShare
quintiles are sorted within Fama-French 17 industries.
Panel A: RShare in Compustat Firms
Sector Agricult Mining Construct Manuf Transp Wholesale Retail Finance Service Admin Total
Mean 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.15 0.24 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.15
Std 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16
N 224 3,379 969 40,581 10,258 3,589 7,733 11,763 17,189 738 96,423
Panel B: Firm Characteristics in Portfolios Sorted by RShare within Industry
Quintiles RShare Mach/Capital Mach/RTL Op.Lev CF Size B/M Mkt.Lev
1 0.02 0.78 3.73 1.06 −0.25 12.77 0.63 0.17
2 0.06 0.74 1.27 1.07 0.13 13.08 0.64 0.20
3 0.12 0.72 0.61 1.13 0.28 13.11 0.67 0.22
4 0.20 0.71 0.35 1.20 0.32 13.10 0.69 0.23
5 0.39 0.70 0.17 1.27 0.40 12.78 0.72 0.23
Panel C: Transition Probabilities across Portfolios Sorted by RShare within Industry
Next Year
Current Year L L 3 4 H
1 0.70 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.03
2 0.14 0.62 0.18 0.04 0.02
3 0.04 0.14 0.60 0.18 0.04
4 0.02 0.03 0.15 0.63 0.16
5 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.76
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Table 2.3
Response of Firm Investment to Aggregate Shocks
This table shows the response of investment in machinery capital (main test) and other
capital (placebo test) to aggregate shocks for firms with different shares of routine-task
labor, RShare. The sample period is 1990-2014 for all columns except for Columns (3)
and (4), which exclude 2002-2004 to rule out the impact of the Job Creation and Worker
Assistant (JCWA) Act of 2002 which provides a tax bonus on corporate investment in
equipment (see Section 2.2.2 for more details). The dependent variables are Investment in
Machines, which is the real growth rate of machinery and equipment at cost (Compustat
item FATE), and Investment in Others, which is the real growth rate of property, plant, and
equipment at cost except for machinery and equipment at cost (PPEGT - FATE). Shock
is the growth rate of real GDP value added. See the Appendix for definitions of firm-level
variables. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dep. Var. Investment in Machines Investment in Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−1 0.041∗∗ 0.037∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.029 0.013
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022) (0.021) (0.048) (0.047)
RSharet−1× Shockt −1.299∗∗ −1.166∗∗ −1.510∗∗ −1.507∗∗ −1.909 −1.333
(0.643) (0.547) (0.684) (0.648) (1.385) (1.362)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.222∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.041)
Cash Flowt−1 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.305∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.073)
Log Assett−1 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 38,616 38,616 33,248 33,248 37,808 37,808
Adjusted R2 0.355 0.406 0.384 0.436 0.312 0.340
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Table 2.4
Response of Firm Investment in Machines to Recessions
This table reports the difference-in-differences results of firms’ investment in machines be-
fore and after the 2001 and 2008-09 recessions conditional on their share of routine-task
labor, RShare. RShare is the ratio of the firm’s total wage expense on routine-task labor
relative to its total wage expense, and it is defined in the year before the recessions, i.e.,
2000 and 2007, respectively. PostRect is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the year is
within one, two, or three years after the recessions (excluding the recession year, i.e., 2001
and 2008), and 0 if the year is within one, two, or three years before recessions, for results
in Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), respectively. The dependent variable is Investment
in Machines, which is the real growth rate of machinery and equipment at cost (Compustat
item FATE). Panel B reports the placebo tests by replacing the recession events, i.e., 2001
and 2008, with expansion events, i.e., 1996 and 2005. See the Appendix in the paper for
definitions of other firm-level variables. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level
and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. The sample period is 1998-2003 and 2005-2010.
Panel A: Main Tests Using Recession Events
1-Year Window 2-Year Window 3-Year Window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RShare × PostRect 0.089∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.182∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.016) (0.012)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.145∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.044) (0.034)
Cash Flowt−1 0.003 −0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.355∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.059) (0.046)
Log Assett−1 −0.038 −0.045∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.016) (0.013)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,409 6,029 14,544 11,867 19,868 16,252
Adjusted R2 0.727 0.770 0.517 0.562 0.453 0.512
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Table 2.4
Response of Firm Investment in Machines to Recessions
— Continued
Panel B: Placebo Tests Using Expansion Events
1-Year Window 2-Year Window 3-Year Window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RShare × PostExpt −0.017 −0.015 −0.005 −0.027 0.009 −0.014
(0.049) (0.045) (0.039) (0.033) (0.032) (0.028)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.107∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.013) (0.011)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.267∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.045) (0.033)
Cash Flowt−1 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.270∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.063) (0.048)
Log Assett−1 0.012 −0.048∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.020) (0.014)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,916 6,359 15,141 12,307 21,730 17,891
Adjusted R2 0.802 0.807 0.546 0.587 0.428 0.479
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Table 2.5
Response of Routine-Task Employment to Aggregate Shocks
Panel A shows the response of routine-task employment changes to aggregate shocks at
the establishment level. Chg. EmpRt−3,t is the establishment’s 3-year change in employ-
ment of routine-task labor normalized by the total number of employees three years earlier.
Chg. RShareEst,Empt−3,t and Chg. RShare
Est
t−3,t are the 3-year changes in the establishment’s
employment-based share of routine-task labor and share of routine-task labor, respectively.
An establishment’s (employment-based) share of routine-task labor is the ratio of its (em-
ployment of routine-task labor) wage expense on its routine-task labor to its (total employ-
ment) total wage expense. In all variable constructions, routine-task labor is defined at
t − 3 and maintains the same definition for three years to form the time-series changes of
the variables. RSharet−3 is the establishment’s parent firm’s RShare three years before in
Columns (1), (3), and (5); and the establishment’s RShare three years before in Columns
(2), (4), and (6). Shockt−3,t is the growth rate of real GDP value added from t−3 to t. Ind
is the Fama-French 17 industry classification. State is the state in which the establishment
is located. Panel B reports the response of routine-task employment to aggregate shocks in
newly opened establishments. An establishment is identified as newly opened in year t if it
does not exist in the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages database in year t−1 but
exists in year t. RShareEst,Empt and RShareEstt are the establishment’s employment-based
share of routine-task labor and share of routine-task labor, respectively. RSharet−1 is the
parent firm’s RShare in year t− 1. Shockt is the growth rate of real GDP value added in
year t. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the firm level in all cases
except for Columns (2), (4), and (6) in Panel A, which are clustered at the establishment
level. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The
sample period is 1996-2014 for Panel A, and 1990-2014 for Panel B.
Panel A: Existing Establishments





Level of RSharet−3: Firm Est. Firm Est. Firm Est.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−3 −0.941∗∗∗ −0.851∗∗∗ −0.802∗∗∗ −0.840∗∗∗ −0.716∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.015) (0.065) (0.009) (0.061) (0.009)
RSharet−3 1.453∗ 0.421∗∗ 0.919∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
× Shockt−3,t (0.764) (0.189) (0.446) (0.111) (0.385) (0.102)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 79,344 79,344 79,344 79,344 79,344 79,344
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.254 0.137 0.380 0.142 0.396
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Table 2.5
Response of Routine-Task Employment to Aggregate Shocks
— Continued
Panel B: Newly Opened Establishments
Dep. Var. RShareEst,Empt RShareEstt
RSharet−1 0.619∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.114)
RSharet−1× Shockt 0.046∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Firm FE Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y
Observations 7,478 7,478
Adjusted R2 0.660 0.659
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Table 2.6
Response of Investment-Employment Correlation to Aggregate Shocks
This table reports the response of correlation between routine-task employment changes
and machinery-investment to aggregate shocks. Chg. EmpRt−3,t is the establishment’s 3-year
change in employment of routine-task labor normalized by the total number of employees
three years earlier. Chg. RShareEst,Empt−3,t and Chg. RShare
Est
t−3,t are the 3-year changes in
the establishment’s employment-based share of routine-task labor and share of routine-task
labor, respectively. An establishment’s (employment-based) share of routine-task labor is
the ratio of its (employment of routine-task labor) wage expense on its routine-task labor
to its (total employment) total wage expense. In all variable constructions, routine-task
labor is defined at t− 3 and maintains the same definition for three years to form the time-
series changes of the variables. RSharet−3 is the establishment’s parent firm’s RShare
three years before. Shockt−3,t is the growth rate of real GDP value added from t− 3 to t.
Panel A shows the main tests in which IMt−3,t is the establishment’s parent firm’s machinery
investment rate from t − 3 to t. Panel B shows the placebo tests in which IOt−3,t is the
establishment’s parent firm’s investment rate in other capital from t − 3 to t. Ind is the
Fama-French 17 industry classification. State is the state in which the establishment is
located. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the firm level. ∗, ∗∗,




Response of Investment-Employment Correlation to Aggregate Shocks
— Continued
Panel A: Main Tests






Shockt−3,t×RSharet−3×IMt−3,t 1.062∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.304) (0.202) (0.185)
Shockt−3,t×IMt−3,t −0.499∗∗∗ −0.251∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.093) (0.086)
RSharet−3×IMt−3,t −0.101∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.031) (0.021) (0.019)
Shockt−3,t×RSharet−3 0.638 0.344 0.190
(0.781) (0.418) (0.339)
RSharet−3 −0.845∗∗∗ −0.740∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.058) (0.050)
IMt−3,t 0.049∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y Y
N 55,339 55,339 55,339
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.129 0.134
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Table 2.6
Response of Investment-Employment Correlation to Aggregate Shocks
— Continued
Panel B: Placebo Tests






Shockt−3,t×RSharet−3×IOt−3,t 0.080 −0.127 −0.101
(0.242) (0.200) (0.180)
Shockt−3,t×IOt−3,t −0.106∗∗ −0.030 −0.023
(0.050) (0.035) (0.032)
RSharet−3×IOt−3,t −0.007 0.010 0.007
(0.028) (0.017) (0.016)
Shockt−3,t×RSharet−3 0.691 0.459 0.289
(0.803) (0.448) (0.363)
RSharet−3 −0.855∗∗∗ −0.752∗∗∗ −0.660∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.060) (0.052)
IOt−3,t 0.010∗∗ 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y Y
N 54,943 54,943 54,943
Adjusted R2 0.154 0.128 0.134
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Table 2.7
Five Portfolios Sorted on RShare Within Industry
This table reports time-series average of stock returns for five portfolios sorted on share
of routine-task labor (RShare) within industry. At the end of each June, firms in each
Fama-French 17 industry are sorted into five equally weighted portfolios based on their
RShare. Excess Returns are monthly returns minus the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Excess
Unlevered Returns are monthly unlevered returns, defined as in equation (2.7), minus the
1-month Treasury bill rate. DGTW-Adjusted Returns are monthly returns adjusted fol-
lowing Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). RShare is lagged by 18 months.
Newey-West standard errors (Newey and West (1987)) are estimated with four lags and
reported in parentheses. All returns are annualized by multiplying by 12 and are reported
in percentages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
Panel A: Excess Returns
E[R]− rf (%) 14.11∗∗∗ 13.17∗∗∗ 12.40∗∗∗ 12.32∗∗∗ 11.02∗∗ −3.10∗
(4.99) (4.51) (4.51) (4.41) (4.32) (1.70)
σ(%) 76.77 68.57 67.54 65.48 64.13 27.62
Panel B: Excess Unlevered Returns
E[RUnlev ]− rf (%) 11.64∗∗∗ 10.07∗∗∗ 9.38∗∗∗ 9.04∗∗∗ 8.32∗∗ −3.32∗∗
(4.20) (3.65) (3.50) (3.30) (3.28) (1.55)
σ(%) 64.56 55.87 52.67 49.96 49.12 24.91
Panel C: DGTW-Adjusted Returns
E[RDGTW ] (%) 3.11∗ 2.83∗∗ 1.82 1.41 −0.24 −3.35∗∗
(1.63) (1.32) (1.33) (1.42) (1.25) (1.44)




This table reports the unconditional CAPM time-series regression results in Panel A and
Conditional CAPM regression results in Panel B for five portfolios sorted on share of routine-
task labor (RShare) within industry. At the end of each June, firms in each Fama-French
17 industry are sorted into five equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare. RShare
is lagged by 18 months. Newey-West standard errors are estimated with four lags for the
unconditional CAPM monthly estimations and with one lag for the conditional CAPM
yearly estimation, reported in parentheses. CAPM alphas are annualized by multiplying
by 12 and are reported in percentages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
Panel A: Unconditional CAPM
MKT β 1.26∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
α (%) 4.08 4.06 3.40 3.67 2.79 −1.29
(2.64) (2.49) (2.40) (2.46) (2.48) (1.70)
R2 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.69 0.18
Panel B: Conditional CAPM
Avg. MKT β 1.60∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)
Avg. α (%) 3.40 2.78 3.48 2.92 1.64 −1.76
(4.68) (4.20) (3.66) (3.42) (3.48) (2.07)
Avg. R2 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.31
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Table 2.9
Panel Regressions of Conditional Betas and Stock Returns on RShare
This table reports the predictability of firms’ share of routine-task labor (RShare) on their
conditional betas and annual stock returns, while controlling for known firm characteristics
that predict risk. Conditional betas are calculated following Lewellen and Nagel (2006) for
each year t. Realized annual stock returns are aggregated from July of year t to June of
year t+ 1 in percentages. RShare is lagged by 18 months. Ind indicates the Fama-French
17 industries. See the Appendix for definitions of firm characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to
June 2014.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Conditional Betas
RSharet−1 -0.48
∗∗∗ -0.45∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.47∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗



















Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05
Panel B: Annual Stock Returns
RSharet−1 -5.66
∗∗ -5.33∗∗ -5.83∗∗ -6.81∗∗∗ -7.09∗∗∗ -6.66∗∗∗ -7.70∗∗∗ -8.69∗∗∗ -12.11∗∗∗



















Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.07
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Table 2.10
Robustness of Standard Errors for Panel Regressions
The table reports two alternative regression analyses with different assumptions for the
correlation structure of the residuals from that in Table 2.9. Columns (1)-(4) report panel
regression results with standard errors clustered by both firm and year. Conditional betas
are calculated following Lewellen and Nagel (2006) for each year t. Realized annual stock
returns are aggregated from July of year t to June of year t + 1 in percentages. RShare
is firms’ share of routine-task labor lagged by 18 months. Columns (5) and (6) report
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression results using monthly stock returns, annualized
by multiplying by 12, and with Newey-West standard errors estimated with four lags. All
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Ind indicates the Fama-French 17 industries.
See the Appendix for definitions of firm characteristics. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to
June 2014.
Panel Regressions with Double-Clustered S.E. Fama-MacBeth
Dep. Var. Conditional Beta Annual Stock Returns Monthly Stock Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−1 −0.47∗∗∗ −0.52∗∗∗ −8.69∗ −12.11∗∗ −4.83∗ −7.64∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (4.68) (4.77) (2.76) (2.78)
Cash Flowt−1 −0.04∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ −0.21 −0.24 0.15 0.10
(0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)
Stock Rett−1 0.20 0.23 −3.23 −3.22 −1.90 −2.06
(0.15) (0.16) (2.78) (3.30) (1.88) (1.96)
Op.Levt−1 −0.07∗ −0.09∗∗ 1.84∗ 0.76 0.89 0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (1.03) (1.41) (0.57) (0.81)
Mkt.Levt−1 0.32∗ 0.13 2.76 1.24 −3.99 −5.05
(0.17) (0.19) (6.46) (7.81) (4.78) (5.05)
Sizet−1 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −1.18 −1.24 −0.50 −0.57
(0.03) (0.03) (0.76) (0.81) (0.57) (0.60)
B/Mt−1 −0.04 −0.03 9.12∗∗∗ 9.36∗∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ 2.31∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (2.49) (2.58) (0.94) (1.05)
Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Yr Ind×Yr Yr Ind -
Observations 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 482,149 482,149
Adj. R2/Avg. R2 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03
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Table 2.11
Panel Regressions of Annual Stock Returns on RShare in Subsamples
This table shows the predictability of firms’ RShare on annual stock returns in subsamples.
Panel A reports the results in the subsamples based on whether the ratio of the firm’s
total number of employees identified in the OES microdata sample to the firm’s number
of employees in the Compustat data is above or below the median for that year. Panel B
reports the results in the subsamples based on whether the firms mentioned two or fewer
states in their 10-K annual report following Garcia and Norli (2012) and Tuzel and Zhang
(2015). Panel C reports the results in the subsamples based on whether the firm’s market
capitalization is below or above the median for that year. See the Appendix for definitions
of variables. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample covers
stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014 in Panel A and Panel C and from July 1994 to
June 2010 in Panel B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Subsample by Employment Identification Ratio
Below Median Above Median
RSharet−1 −8.11∗∗∗ −9.24∗∗∗ −9.24∗∗ −16.23∗∗∗
(3.08) (2.96) (3.84) (3.57)
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 20,402 20,402 20,395 20,395
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.07
Panel B: Subsample by Geographic Dispersion
Two or Fewer States in 10-K More than Two States in 10-K
RSharet−1 −19.46∗∗ −22.68∗∗∗ −9.52∗∗∗ −12.54∗∗∗
(7.99) (7.33) (3.13) (2.99)
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 3,806 3,806 21,934 21,934
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.07
Panel C: Subsample by Firm Size
Below Median Above Median
RSharet−1 −12.77∗∗∗ −16.50∗∗∗ −3.33 −5.62∗∗
(3.75) (3.59) (2.28) (2.18)
Firm Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 20,547 20,547 20,533 20,533
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.07 0.19 0.11
76
Table 2.12
Time-Series of Firms’ Characteristics and Risk around Recessions
Panel A presents the production characteristics of firms in the top (H) and bottom (L)
quintile portfolios sorted by share of routine-task labor (RShare) within industry, as well
as the unpaired difference in means test results between the two portfolios (H − L). Panel
B presents the market betas of the two quintile portfolios and the long-short portfolio.
In the year 2000 and 2007, firms in each Fama-French 17 industry are sorted into five
equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare in the previous year. The portfolio
formation maintains the same for four years. Mach/Emp is the ratio of machinery at cost
(Compustat item FATE) to number of employees (EMP) in million dollars per employee.
Op.Lev is the operating leverage defined following Novy-Marx (2011). Firms are required
to have Mach/Emp and Op.Lev available for all four years around the recessions and also
have stock returns available for 48 months around the recessions (i.e., July 2000 to June
2004 and July 2007 to June 2011). MKT β is the regression coefficient of regressing the
portfolios’ excess returns on the market excess returns from July of the current year to
June of the following year, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. See the Appendix for
definitions of the production characteristics.
Panel A: Firm Production Characteristics
Portfolios Formed in Year Prior to Recession
t− 1 Recession t+ 1 t+ 2
Mach/Emp
H 0.067∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
L 0.080∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
H−L −0.014∗ −0.012 −0.011 −0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Op.Lev
H 1.257∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
L 1.117∗∗∗ 1.171∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.056) (0.055) (0.054)
H−L 0.141∗∗ 0.124 0.128∗ 0.127
(0.071) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077)
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Table 2.12
Time-Series of Firms’ Characteristics and Risk around Recessions
— Continued
Panel B: Portfolio Risk Measure
Portfolios Formed in Year Prior to Recession
t− 1 Recession t+ 1 t+ 2
MKT β
H 0.709∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.125) (0.105) (0.115)
L 0.992∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ 1.354∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.093) (0.115) (0.148)
H−L −0.283∗∗ −0.075 −0.198∗∗ −0.057






































































































Figure 2.1 Monthly employment of high-routine occupations and low-routine occupa-
tions.
This figure illustrates the monthly employment of routine-task labor and non-routine-
task labor using the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly basic data. The left
axis corresponds the employment of routine-task labor, and the right axis corresponds
the employment of non-routine-task labor. I crosswalk the occupation classifications
of different years to a unified occupation classification occ1990, which is available at
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series at the University of Minnesota. Following
Autor and Dorn (2013), I obtain the task skill data from the Dictionary of Occupa-
tion Titles, fourth edition and revised fourth edition, and calculate the routine-task
intensity (RTI) score for each occ1990 occupation as in equation (2.1). I classify
an occupation as High-Routine Occupation or Low-Routine Occupation if its RTI
score is in the bottom or top 30% of the RTI distribution in the 1980 Census. The
monthly employment is aggregated from the number of individuals in the occupa-
tions, weighted by CPS sampling weights, and seasonally adjusted using the Census
X12 ARIMA. The shaded areas indicate the NBER recession months.
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Figure 2.2 Time-series of machine price and wages.
Panel A presents the quality-adjusted price of equipment and software provided by
Ryan Isaelsen. The price index is aggregated from the price of 22 groups of durable
equipment and software presented by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. These data
are first constructed by Gordon (1990) and later extended by Israelsen (2010). Panel
B presents the hourly wage of occupations by routine-task intensity score. The nom-
inal hourly wage for each occupation is the average hourly wage of individuals in
that occupation, weighted by the sample personal earnings weights, from the sample
of the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group maintained by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research. See Figure 2.1 for definitions of high-routine
occupations and low-routine occupations. The shaded areas indicate recession years.
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Figure 2.3 Actual and counterfactual employment of high-routine occupations and
low-routine occupations around the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002.
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (JCWA Act) was introduced
on October 11, 2011. Its first passage vote took place on October 24, 2011, and
it was signed by President George W. Bush on March 9, 2002. The JCWA Act
offers a 30% tax bonus on new qualified property, mostly machinery and equipment,
that is acquired by companies after September 10, 2011 and placed in service before
September 11, 2004. The actual employment is from October 2000 to October 2002.
Following Jaimovich and Siu (2014), I construct counterfactual data by pairing July
1990 and March 2001 which are the starting months of the recessions of 1990 and
2001 according to the National Bureau of Economic Research, respectively. I rescale
the counterfactual series to match the magnitude of the fall in actual employment
from the starting month of the 2001 recession to the month in which the JCWA Act
was introduced. The monthly employment series of high-routine occupations and
low-routine occupations are described in Figure 2.1. These series are further logged
and band-pass filtered to remove fluctuations at frequencies higher than 12 months.





Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Value Function of Automated Projects
























































θ(u−s)dBεu, which is a random variable that follows a normal
distribution (see Shreve (2004) section 6.9). The mean and variance of vs are given
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Exchanging the expectation operator and the integral operator in (A.2) using






































A.1.2 Function of Optimal Discounting
Given that the payoff of exercising the switching option is monotonically
decreasing in At (see equation (1.12)) and also that the process of At exhibits positive
serially correlation, we know that the optimal exercise of the switching option is when
At falls below a certain threshold A∗ (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) section 4.1.D).
In order to calculate Êt[e−(r+δ)τ ], note that the stochastic discount factor
uniquely corresponds to a risk-neutral probability measure P̂, under which B̂xt =

















where P is the physical probability measure. Given that Bzt and Bεt are idiosyncratic,
they have the same dynamics under P and P̂. Let ât = logAt + σΛσxθ , then the
dynamics of ât under P̂ are
dât = −θâtdt+ σadB̂t, (A.6)
where B̂t = σxB̂xt+σzBzt+σεBεtσa is still a standard Brownian motion under P̂. Therefore,
τ equals the time passed until ât reaches â∗ = logA∗+σΛσxθ for the first time. Applying












































































where Γ(x) is the Euler gamma function and H(α, γ; z) is the Kummer function
defined as








with (η)n = η(η + 1) · · · (η + n− 1).
Q.E.D.
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A.1.3 Comparison of Project Risks
I first prove that the beta of the assets in place of an unautomated project,
βAPU , is larger than that of a goods-producing automated project that has the same
set of shocks to the unautomated project, βA. It is easy to see that V APU = VA− cRr+δ .
Hence, applying the definition of beta in equation (1.19), we have βAPU > βA for any
At.
I then prove that the beta of a newly initiated automated project minus
investments in machines, βnewA , is lower than a goods-producing automated project,














































The parameters presented in Table A.1 satisfy this condition.
Finally, I provide the equation that determines Ā(t0). Note that the beta for
an unautomated project, βU(t), and an automated project initiated at t0, βA(t0; t),
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where Ȯ(At, A∗) = dO(At,A
∗)
dAt
and t′ = max(t0 +T −t, 0). Therefore, Ā(t0) is deterined




















Given that the risk comparison between automated and unautomated projects
holds conditionally in Proposition 3, I simulate the model under economically reason-
able parameters to examine whether the switching option channel is powerful enough
to generate lower risk premia for high-RShare firms in the cross-section. In addition,
this test also helps to examine whether the predictability of RShare on stock returns
is robust to the dynamic setting in which RShare evolves endogenously.
Panel A of Table A.1 summarizes the parameter choices. My model setup
shares many similar features with Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014), who also develop
a model at the project level. Hence, I adopt the parameter values used by Kogan
and Papanikolaou (2014) as many as possible. Specifically, I adopt the parameter
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values in Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) for volatilities of xt, zt and εt, rate of
mean-reversion, risk-free rate, and project obsolescence rate.1 The required time for
technology adoption is absent in the model of Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014). I
thus set the required time to be three quarters following the time-to-build literature
(e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1982) find that a reasonable range for the average
construction period is three to five quarters).
Given that Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) have two factors in their pricing
kernel while my model only has one, I choose the price of risk to match the equal-
weighted aggregate risk premium. Because I assume a constant price of risk in my
stochastic discount factor for tractability, I need an unrealistically high value for the
price of risk to match the risk premium.2 In addition, my model has a much simpler
setting for growth opportunities compared to the model of Kogan and Papanikolaou
(2014), I thus set the project arrival rate to match the aggregate dividend growth
rate.
The literature offers less guidance on the cost of different production factors
at the project level. I thus match several moments to pin down these parameters.
The per-project cost for using routine-task labor, cR, and non-routine-task labor, cN ,
are chosen to match the aggregate share of routine-task labor in my sample. The
1Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014) use 0, 0.35, and 0.5 as the rates of mean-reversion for the
aggregate shocks, firm-level shocks, and project-level shocks, respectively. My model requires the
rate of mean-reversion to be the same for all levels of shocks. Thus, I choose the rate of mean-
reversion to be 0.35 in my simulation.
2It is well-known in the literature that a countercyclical price of risk in the stochastic discount
factor is crucial for generating high risk premium. See alternative specifications of stochastic dis-
count factor in Zhang (2005) and Jones and Tuzel (2013).
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rest of the operating cost, f , is chosen to match the correlation between gross hiring
and GDP growth. Cost of project initiation, I, and cost of machines per automated
project, IM , are chosen to match the correlation between gross investment and GDP
growth. See Panel B of Table A.1 for the moments.
Plugging these parameter values into equations (1.13), (1.15), and (1.16), we
obtain the optimal thresholds for exercising switching options and growth options.
Under these parameter values, A∗ = 0.75 and A∗∗ = 0.81, while the 40th, 50th, and
60th percentiles of At are 0.63, 1.00, and 1.58, respectively.
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Table A.1
Parameter Values and Target Moments
Panel A presents the parameter values used in the illustrating example. Panel B presents
the moments used to pinpoint some of the parameter values. A firm’s share of routine-task
labor is the ratio of the total wage expense on its routine-task labor relative to its total wage
expense, as defined in equation (1.6). Aggregate share of routine-task labor is calculated
based on the firm sample from 1990 to 2014 (see Section 2.2 for details). Aggregate gross
investment is the total real investment in fixed assets normalized by the previous year’s real
fixed assets, using data from the Standard Fixed Assets Tables provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. GDP growth is the real growth rate of GDP value added. Aggregate
gross hiring is the ratio of the total real earnings of the new hires of stable jobs in the current
quarter to the total real earnings of the stable jobs in the last quarter, and annualized by
multiplying by 4, using data from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators provided by the
Census Bureau.
Panel A: Parameter Values
Parameters Symbol Value Source
Technology
Volatility of aggregate shock σx 0.13 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)
Volatility of firm-specific shock σz 0.20 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)
Volatility of project-specific shock σε 1.50 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)
Rate of mean reversion θ 0.35 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)
Project
Operating cost except for wage expense f 2.05 Matching moments
Total wages for non-routine-task labor cN 0.25 Matching moments
Total wages for routine-task labor cR 0.45 Matching moments
Investment for project initiation I 3.90 Matching moments
Investment in machines per automated project IM 0.50 Matching moments
Required time for technology adoption T 0.75 Kydland and Prescott (1982)
Project obsolescence rate δ 0.10 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)
Project arrival rate λ 12 Matching moments
Stochastic discount factor
Risk-free rate r 0.025 Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014)




Mean of aggregate dividend growth 0.02 0.02
Aggregate share of routine-task labor 0.14 0.14
Correlation between gross investment and GDP Growth 0.64 0.54
Correlation between gross hiring and GDP Growth 0.74 0.69
Asset pricing moments
Mean of equal-weighted aggregate risk premium 0.13 0.13
90
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Sample Construction
Monthly common stock data is from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP share code SHRCD =10 or 11). The sample includes stocks listed on
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Accounting information is from Standard and Poor’s
Compustat annual industrial files. Following Fama and French (1993), in order to
avoid the survival bias in the data, I include firms in my sample after they have
appeared in Compustat for two years. I follow the literature and exclude firms with
primary standard industrial classifications between 4900 and 4999 (regulated) and
between 6000 and 6999 (financial). I exclude firm-year observations. In every sample
year, firm-level accounting variables and size measures are Winsorized at the 1% level
(0.5% in each tail of the distribution) to reduce the influence of possible outliers. I
also exclude from the sample the lowest 20th size quantile (i.e., 5% of the sample
of firms) to avoid anomalies driven by micro-cap firms, as discussed in Fama and
French (2008). I aggregate OES establishments to Compustat firms using Employer
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Identification Number and supplement the matching by using legal names.
I rank firms based on their share of routine-task labor relative to their industry
peers as follows. I first categorize firms into 17 industries using the Fama and French
(1997) classification. Within each industry, I sort firms into five portfolios based on
their share of routine-task labor in each year. Thus, portfolio L includes firms that
are in the bottom quintiles in terms of share of routine-task labor from all industries.
Similarly, I construct portfolios 2, 3, 4, and H.
I construct the following variables for firms:
• RShare is firms’ share of routine-task labor created following equation (2.2).
• Mach/Capital is the ratio of machinery and equipment at cost to capital,
which is the sum of machinery and equipment at cost (Compustat item FATE)
and structures at cost, including building (FATB), construction in progress
(FATC), and land and improvements (FATP).
• Mach/RTL is the ratio of machinery and equipment at cost (FATE) to the
total number of routine-task labor in the firm, at $ millions per worker. A
firm’s total number of routine-task labor is calculated as the total number of
routine-task labor of its establishments identified in the microdata, projected
to the firm level using total number of employees from Compustat (EMP).
• CF is cash flow defined as earnings before extraordinary items (IB) plus de-
preciation (DP) and is normalized by capital stock (PPENT) at the beginning
of the year following Malmendier and Tate (2005).
• Stock Ret is firms’ annual stock returns.
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• Op.Lev is firms’ operating leverage defined as cost of goods sold (COGS) plus
selling, general, and administrative expenses (SGA); and is normalized by total
assets (AT) following Novy-Marx (2011).
• Mkt.Lev is firms’ financial leverage defined as the proportion of total debt
to market value of the firm defined following Fan, Titman, and Twite (2012).
Total debt is the book value of short-term (DLC) and long-term interest bearing
debt (DLTT). Market value of the firm is the market value of common equity
plus book value of preferred stock (PSTK) plus total debt. Market value of
common equity is defined as in Fama and French (1992).
• Size and B/M are the natural logarithms of firms’ market value and firms’
book-to-market, respectively, defined following Fama and French (1992).
• IM is firms’ investment in machines, calculated as the ratio of current year’s
machinery and equipment at cost (FATE) to the previous year’s machinery and
equipment at cost minus one.
• IS is firms’ investment in structures, calculated as the ratio of current year’s
structures at cost to the previous year’s structures at cost minus one. Firms’
structures at cost is the sum of building (FATB), construction in progress
(FATC), and land and improvements (FATP) at cost.
• IO is firms’ investment in capital other than machines, calculated as the ratio
of current year’s other capital to the previous other capital minus one. Firms’
other capital is the property, plant, and equipment at cost (PPEGT) except
for machinery and equipment (FATE) at cost.
• Shock: Real growth rate of GDP value added.
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• Tobin’s Q is firms’ Tobin’s Q defined as the ratio of firms’ market value, the
sum of total liability (LT) and market equity, to total assets (AT). Market
equity is defined as in Fama and French (1992).
• Cash Holding is firms’ cash holding defined as cash and short-term investments
(CHE), normalized by total assets (AT).
• Asset is firms’ total assets (AT).
B.2 Appendix Tables
In this Appendix, I provide supplementary results on (1) the most and the
least routine occupations, (2) a difference-in-differences test of firm investment in
machines before and after recessions, (3) a decomposition of market betas following
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), and (4) several robustness checks.
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Table B.1
Most and Least Routine Occupations
This table reports the 10 occupations with the highest routine-task intensity (RTI) scores
and the 10 occupations with the lowest, as of 2014.
SOC Occupation Title RTI Score
Panel A: Top 10 Occupations with the Highest RTI Score
43-9051 Mail Clerks and Mail Machine Operators, Except Postal Service 1.66
43-4071 File Clerks 1.65
51-9031 Cutters and Trimmers, Hand 1.64
51-3093 Food Cooking Machine Operators and Tenders 1.62
51-9022 Grinding and Polishing Workers, Hand 1.61
51-6062 Textile Cutting Machine Setters, Operators, and Tenders 1.57
43-6012 Legal Secretaries 1.54
43-4021 Correspondence Clerks 1.47
53-7011 Conveyor Operators and Tenders 1.47
23-2091 Court Reporters 1.42
Panel B: Bottom 10 Occupations with the Lowest RTI Score
39-9031 Fitness Trainers and Aerobics Instructors -2.98
33-1021 First-Line Supervisors of Fire Fighting and Prevention Workers -2.95
17-2021 Agricultural Engineers -2.73
19-3092 Geographers -2.73
11-9021 Construction Managers -2.61
13-1141 Compensation, Benefits, and Job Analysis Specialists -2.53
21-1094 Community Health Workers -2.53
53-5031 Ship Engineers -2.41
25-2012 Kindergarten Teachers, Except Special Education -2.38
53-4011 Locomotive Engineers -2.28
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Table B.2
Robustness: Firm Investment in Machines and Recessions
This table reports the difference-in-differences results of firms’ investment in machines be-
fore and after the 2001 and 2008-09 recessions conditional on their share of routine-task
labor, RShare. RShare is the ratio of the firm’s total wage expense on routine-task labor
relative to its total wage expense, and it is defined in the year before the recessions, i.e.,
2000 and 2007, respectively. In Panel A, Post t is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
year is within one, two, or three years after the beginning of recessions (including the event
years), and 0 if the year is within one, two, or three years before recessions, for results
in Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), respectively. Panel B uses the same definition of
Post t. Panel C redefines Post t as excluding the recession years, i.e., 2001 and 2008. The
dependent variable is Investment in Machines, which is the real growth rate of machinery
and equipment at cost (Compustat item FATE). See the Appendix in the paper for defini-
tions of other firm-level variables. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and
reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. The sample period is 1998-2003 and 2005-2010.
Panel A: Event Studies in Various Windows
1-Year Window 2-Year Window 3-Year Window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RShare × Postt 0.098∗∗ 0.052 0.092∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.032) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.151∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.012) (0.010)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.186∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.243∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.035) (0.027)
Cash Flowt−1 −0.001 −0.001 −0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.425∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.052) (0.041)
Log Assett−1 −0.035∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.010)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,022 6,498 15,432 12,571 22,214 18,153
Adjusted R2 0.539 0.617 0.414 0.475 0.357 0.432
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Table B.2
Robustness: Firm Investment in Machines and Recessions
— Continued
Panel B: Difference-in-Differences in 3-Year Window Controlling for Cross-Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RShare × Postt 0.052∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.050∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.040
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.178∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 −0.013 −0.008




× Postt (0.021) (0.026)
Cash Flowt−1 −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.002)
Cash Flowt−1 0.003∗∗ 0.002
× Postt (0.001) (0.002)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.509∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.046)
Cash Holdingt−1 −0.173∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗
× Postt (0.032) (0.035)
Log Assett−1 −0.088∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.010)
Log Assett−1 × Postt 0.009∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 18,216 18,205 21,772 22,208 22,212 18,153
Adjusted R2 0.412 0.407 0.357 0.371 0.367 0.433
97
Table B.2
Robustness: Firm Investment in Machines and Recessions
— Continued
Panel C: Subsample by Recessions
2001 Recession 2008 Recession
[-1, 1] [-2, 2] [-3, 3] [-1, 1] [-2, 2] [-3, 3]
RShare × Postt 0.071 0.091∗∗ 0.074∗ 0.069 0.084∗∗ 0.058
(0.056) (0.040) (0.039) (0.053) (0.040) (0.041)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.223∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024) (0.017) (0.012)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.067 −0.257∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.277∗∗∗ −0.258∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.062) (0.048) (0.067) (0.061) (0.048)
Cash Flowt−1 0.018 0.014∗∗ 0.011∗∗ −0.003 −0.004∗ −0.003
(0.014) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.553∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.101) (0.084) (0.066) (0.065) (0.052)
Log Assett−1 −0.043 −0.083∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.030 −0.009 −0.003
(0.046) (0.025) (0.022) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,004 5,828 7,425 3,025 6,039 8,827
Adjusted R2 0.782 0.597 0.564 0.766 0.524 0.440
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Table B.3
Robustness Check: Firm Other Investments to Aggregate Shocks
This table shows the response of various types of investments to aggregate shocks for firms
with different share of routine-task labor, RShare. Capx is firms’ capital expenditure (Com-
pustat item CAPX) normalized by last year’s total assets (AT). ∆All but Mach is the growth
rate of total capital except for machinery and equipment at cost (PPEGT − FATE). R&D
is firms’ expenditure on research and development (XRD) normalized by last year’s total
assets. ∆PPENT is the growth rate of the net value of property, plant, and equipment
(PPENT). ∆PPEGT is the growth rate of the gross value of property, plant, and equipment
(PPEGT). ∆AT is the growth rate of total assets (AT). Divest is firms’ sales of property,
plant, and equipment (SPPE) normalized by the previous year’s total assets. All variables
are constructed in real terms. Shock is the growth rate of real GDP value added. Ind is
the Fama-French 17 industry classification. See the Appendix for definitions of firm-level
variables. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample
period is 1990-2014.
Dep. Var. Capx R&D ∆PPENT ∆PPEGT ∆AT Divest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−1 −1.731∗∗ 0.092 −1.066 −0.719 −0.189 0.182
× Shockt (0.715) (0.164) (0.799) (0.531) (0.632) (0.165)
RSharet−1 0.042 −0.002 0.030 0.012 0.009 −0.005
(0.026) (0.006) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.006)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.191∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.008) (0.002) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.133∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.353∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.005) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.004)
Cash Flowt−1 0.002 −0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.505∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.031) (0.008) (0.042) (0.024) (0.027) (0.004)
Log Assett−1 −0.030∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.001)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 55,220 32,388 56,648 54,358 56,702 42,502
Adjusted R2 0.473 0.811 0.346 0.419 0.418 0.333
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Table B.4
Robustness Check: Firm Investment and Aggregate Shocks
— All Variables Standardized
This table shows the response of investment in machinery capital (main test) and other
capital (placebo test) to aggregate shocks for firms with different shares of routine-task
labor, RShare. RShare is the ratio of a firm’s total wage expense on its routine-task labor
to its total wage expense, as defined in equation (24). The sample period is 1990-2014 for all
columns except for Columns (3) and (4) which exclude 2002-2004 to rule out the impact of
the Job Creation and Worker Assistant (JCWA) Act of 2002 (see Section B.4. in the paper
for details about the JCWA Act). The dependent variables are Investment in Machines,
which is the real growth rate of machinery and equipment at cost (Compustat item FATE),
and Investment in Others, which is the real growth rate of property, plant, and equipment
at cost except for machinery and equipment at cost (PPEGT - FATE). Shock is the growth
rate of real GDP value added. Ind is the Fama-French 17 industry classification. See the
Appendix for definitions of firm-level variables. All variables are standardized so that the
mean equals 0 and the standard deviation equals 1. All standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dep. Var. Investment in Machines Investment in Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−1 0.004 0.003 0.002 −0.000 −0.004 −0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
RSharet−1×Shockt −0.011∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.007 −0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.234∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Cash Flowt−1 0.008 0.010 0.035
(0.020) (0.023) (0.029)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.202∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Log Assett−1 −0.146∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.037)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 38,616 38,616 33,248 33,248 37,808 37,808
Adjusted R2 0.355 0.406 0.384 0.436 0.312 0.340
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Table B.5
Robustness Check: Firm Investment and Aggregate Shocks (Additional)
— All Variables Standardized and Controlling for Cross-Terms
This table shows the response of investment in machines to aggregate shocks for firms with different shares of
routine-task labor, RShare. The dependent variable is Investment in Machines, which is the real growth rate of
machinery and equipment at cost (Compustat item FATE). Shock is the growth rate of real GDP value added. All
variables are standardized so that the mean equals 0 and the standard deviation equals 1. Ind is the Fama-French
17 industry classification. See the Appendix for definitions of firm-level variables. All standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
Dep. Var. Investment in Machines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RSharet−1× Shockt −0.010∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.008∗ −0.009∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.004 −0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
RSharet−1 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.234∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Mkt Levert−1 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗ −0.174∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Cash Flowt−1 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.008
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.971∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.971∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.091) (0.088)
Log Assett−1 −0.069∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)




Cash Flowt−1× Shockt 0.002
(0.018)
Cash Holdingt−1× Shockt 0.071∗∗∗
(0.013)
Log Assett−1× Shockt −0.073∗∗∗
(0.017)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y N N N N N N
Observations 38,616 38,616 38,616 38,616 38,616 38,616 38,616
Adjusted R2 0.406 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.405 0.404
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Table B.6
Robustness Check: Firm Investment and Aggregate Shocks (Alt. RShare)
This table shows the response of investment in machinery capital (main test) and other
capital (placebo test) to aggregate shocks for firms with different shares of routine-task
labor, RShare. RShare is the ratio of a firm’s total wage expense on its routine-task labor
to its total wage expense, as defined in equation (24) using P75 instead of P80. The sample
period is 1990-2014 for all columns except for Columns (3) and (4) which exclude 2002-
2004 to rule out the impact of the Job Creation and Worker Assistant (JCWA) Act of 2002
(see Section B.4. in the paper for details about the JCWA Act). The dependent variables
are Investment in Machines, which is the real growth rate of machinery and equipment
at cost (Compustat item FATE), and Investment in Others, which is the real growth rate
of property, plant, and equipment at cost except for machinery and equipment at cost
(PPEGT - FATE). Shock is the growth rate of real GDP value added. Ind is the Fama-
French 17 industry classification. See the Appendix for definitions of firm-level variables.
All standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dep. Var. Investment in Machines Investment in Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−1 0.046∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.014 −0.001
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.042) (0.041)
RSharet−1× Shockt −1.145∗∗ −0.964∗ −1.334∗∗ −1.279∗∗ −0.946 −0.367
(0.556) (0.532) (0.593) (0.562) (1.254) (1.229)
Log Tobin’s Qt−1 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017)
Mkt.Levt−1 −0.222∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.041)
Cash Flowt−1 0.000 0.000 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Cash Holdingt−1 0.305∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.073)
Log Assett−1 −0.022∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.013)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 38,616 38,616 33,248 33,248 37,808 37,808
Adjusted R2 0.355 0.406 0.384 0.436 0.312 0.340
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Table B.7
Robustness Check: Establishment Routine-Task Employment
— Using An Alternative Classification of Routine-Task Labor
Panel A shows the response of routine-task employment changes to aggregate shocks at
establishment level. Workers with occupations that fall in the top quartile (instead of the
top quintile) of the distribution, in terms of the occupations’ routine-task intensity scores,
are classified as routine-task labor. Chg. EmpRt−3,t is the establishment’s 3-year change in
employment of routine-task labor normalized by the total number of employees three years
earlier. Chg. RShareEst,Empt−3,t and Chg. RShare
Est
t−3,t are the 3-year changes in the estab-
lishment’s employment-based share of routine-task labor and share of routine-task labor,
respectively. An establishment’s (employment-based) share of routine-task labor is the ra-
tio of its (total employment of routine-task labor) total wage expense on its routine-task
labor to its (total number of employees) total wage expense. In all variable constructions,
routine-task labor is defined at t − 3 and maintains the same definition for three years
to form the time-series changes of the variables. RSharet−3 is the establishment’s parent
firm’s RShare three years before in Columns (1), (3), and (5); and the establishment’s
RShare three years before in Columns (2), (4), and (6). Shockt−3,t is the growth rate of
real GDP value added from t − 3 to t. Ind is the Fama-French 17 industry classification.
State is the state in which the establishment is located. Panel B reports the response of
routine-task employment to aggregate shocks in newly opened establishments. An estab-
lishment is identified as newly opened in year t if it does not exist in the Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages database in year t− 1 but exists in year t. RShareEst,Empt and
RShareEstt are the establishment’s employment-based share of routine-task labor and share
of routine-task labor, respectively. RSharet−1 is the establishment’s parent firm’s RShare
in year t − 1. Shockt is the growth rate of real GDP value added in year t. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level in all cases except for Columns (2), (4), and (6) in
Panel A, which are clustered at the establishment level, and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is
1996-2014 for Panel A, and 1990-2014 for Panel B.
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Table B.7
Robustness Check: Establishment Routine-Task Employment
— Using An Alternative Classification of Routine-Task Labor
— Continued
Panel A: Existing Establishments





Level of RSharet−3: Firm Est. Firm Est. Firm Est.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSharet−3 −0.900∗∗∗ −0.833∗∗∗ −0.744∗∗∗ −0.812∗∗∗ −0.679∗∗∗ −0.750∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.015) (0.058) (0.009) (0.055) (0.008)
RSharet−3 1.533∗∗ 0.310 0.853∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
×Shockt−3,t (0.752) (0.197) (0.378) (0.101) (0.338) (0.094)
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 79,344 79,344 79,344 79,344 79,344 79,344
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.240 0.134 0.380 0.137 0.395
Panel B: Newly Opened Establishments






RSharet−1× Shockt 0.073∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Firm FE Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y
Observations 7,478 7,478
Adjusted R2 0.648 0.657
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Table B.8
Robustness Check: Establishment Routine-Task Employment (Additional)
— Using The Sample of All Establishments
This table shows the response of labor composition to aggregate shocks of existing estab-
lishments with different shares of routine-task labor, using a sample of all establishments,
including those that cannot be matched to the Compustat firms. Chg. EmpRt−3,t is the
establishment’s 3-year change in employment of routine-task labor normalized by the total
number of employees three years earlier. Chg. RShareEst,Empt−3,t and Chg. RShare
Est
t−3,t are the
3-year changes in the establishment’s employment-based share of routine-task labor and
share of routine-task labor, respectively. An establishment’s (employment-based) share of
routine-task labor is the ratio of its (total employment of routine-task labor) total wage
expense on its routine-task labor to its (total number of employees) total wage expense.
In all variable constructions, routine-task labor is defined at t− 3 and maintains the same
definition for three years to form the time-series changes of the variables. RSharet−3 is the
establishment’s RShare three years before. Shockt−3,t is the growth rate of real GDP value
added from t− 3 to t. Ind is the establishment’s industry classification at the SIC division
level. State is the state in which the establishment is located. Firm is at the Employment
Identification Number (EIN) level. Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level
and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. The sample period is 1996-2014.






RSharet−3 −1.132∗∗∗ −0.945∗∗∗ −1.020∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
RSharet−3× Shockt−3,t 1.523∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.097) (0.051)
Firm FE Y Y Y
Ind×Year FE Y Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 1,232,590 1,232,590 1,232,590
Adjusted R2 0.248 0.223 0.467
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Table B.9
Comparison of RShare in Existing and Newly Opened Establishments
This table reports the effect of aggregate shocks on the differences between newly opened
establishments and existing establishments in terms of their share of routine-task labor
(RShare). Newt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the establishment is newly opened
in year t. An establishment is identified as newly opened in year t if it does not exist in the
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages database in year t − 1 but exists in year t.
RShareEst,Empt and RShareEstt are the establishment’s employment-based share of routine-
task labor and share of routine-task labor in year t, respectively. Shockt is the growth rate
of real GDP value added in year t. Ind is the establishment’s industry classification at the
SIC division level. State is the state in which the establishment is located. Standard errors
are clustered at the establishment level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent
significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is 1990-2014.




Newt× Shockt 0.179∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.056)
Ind×Year FE Y Y
State×Year FE Y Y
Observations 7,354,498 7,354,498
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.104
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Table B.10
Robustness Check: Five Portfolios Sorted on RShare
— Sorting Across All Firms Instead of Within Industry
This table reports the time-series average of stock returns for five portfolios sorted on share
of routine-task labor (RShare) across all firms (instead of within industry). At the end
of each June, firms are sorted into five equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare.
Excess Returns are monthly returns minus the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Excess Un-
levered Returns are monthly unlevered returns, defined as in equation (28), minus the
1-month Treasury bill rate. DGTW-Adjusted Returns are monthly returns adjusted fol-
lowing Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). RShare is lagged by 18 months.
Newey-West standard errors (Newey and West (1987)) are estimated with four lags and
reported in parentheses. All returns are annualized by multiplying by 12 and are reported
in percentages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
Panel A: Excess Returns
E[R]− rf (%) 15.20∗∗∗ 12.14∗∗∗ 13.46∗∗∗ 11.81∗∗∗ 10.38∗∗ −4.82∗∗
(4.98) (4.45) (4.55) (4.50) (4.38) (1.96)
σ(%) 76.55 69.00 68.05 66.59 64.12 32.00
Panel B: Excess Unlevered Returns
E[RUnlev ]− rf (%) 12.73∗∗∗ 9.12∗∗ 9.95∗∗∗ 8.49∗∗ 7.92∗∗ −4.81∗∗∗
(4.27) (3.53) (3.46) (3.39) (3.32) (1.74)
σ(%) 65.51 55.22 52.54 50.52 49.13 28.92
Panel C: DGTW-Adjusted Returns
E[RDGTW ] (%) 4.63∗∗∗ 1.73 2.59∗ 1.16 −1.34 −5.98∗∗∗
(1.64) (1.09) (1.35) (1.48) (1.47) (1.58)
σ(%) 24.50 18.46 20.71 20.01 22.06 25.76
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Table B.11
Robustness Check: CAPM Regressions
— Sorting Across All Firms Instead of Within Industry
This table reports the unconditional CAPM time-series regression results in Panel A and
Conditional CAPM regression results in Panel B for five portfolios sorted on share of routine-
task labor (RShare) across all firms (instead of within industry). At the end of each June,
firms are sorted into five equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare. RShare is
lagged by 18 months. Newey-West standard errors are estimated with four lags for the
unconditional CAPM monthly estimations and with one lag for the conditional CAPM
yearly estimation, reported in parentheses. CAPM alphas are annualized by multiplying
by 12 and are reported in percentages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
Panel A: Unconditional CAPM
MKT β 1.25∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 5.30∗ 2.89 4.48∗ 3.00 2.21 −3.08
(2.77) (2.29) (2.51) (2.54) (2.53) (1.98)
R2 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.68 0.12
Panel B: Conditional CAPM
Avg. MKT β 1.59∗∗∗ 1.50∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
Avg. α (%) 4.67 0.92 4.75 2.54 1.06 −3.61
(4.85) (3.97) (3.80) (3.36) (3.66) (2.41)
Avg. R2 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.77 0.35
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Table B.12
Robustness Check: Five Portfolios Sorted on RShare Within Industry
— Using An Alternative Classification of Routine-Task Labor
This table reports time-series average of stock returns for five portfolios sorted on share of
routine-task labor (RShare) within industry. RShare is the ratio of a firm’s total wage
expense on its routine-task labor to its total wage expense, as defined in equation (24)
using P75 instead of P80. At the end of each June, firms in each Fama-French 17 industry
are sorted into five equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare. Excess Returns
are monthly returns minus the 1-month Treasury bill rate. Excess Unlevered Returns are
monthly unlevered returns, defined as in equation (28), minus the 1-month Treasury bill
rate. DGTW-Adjusted Returns are monthly returns adjusted following Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1997). RShare is lagged by 18 months. Newey-West standard errors
(Newey and West (1987)) are estimated with four lags and reported in parentheses. All
returns are annualized by multiplying by 12 and are reported in percentages. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample covers stock
returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
Panel A: Excess Returns
E[R]− rf (%) 14.38∗∗∗ 12.55∗∗∗ 12.96∗∗∗ 12.09∗∗∗ 11.00∗∗ −3.37∗∗
(4.91) (4.45) (4.60) (4.36) (4.45) (1.70)
σ(%) 75.93 69.26 67.99 64.54 64.68 27.34
Panel B: Excess Unlevered Returns
E[RUnlev ]− rf (%) 11.89∗∗∗ 9.83∗∗∗ 9.84∗∗∗ 8.83∗∗∗ 8.05∗∗ −3.84∗∗
(4.12) (3.67) (3.55) (3.32) (3.29) (1.55)
σ(%) 63.89 57.16 52.68 49.76 48.62 25.01
Panel C: DGTW-Adjusted Returns
E[RDGTW ] (%) 3.72∗∗ 2.09 2.22 1.27 −0.39 −4.11∗∗∗
(1.61) (1.28) (1.46) (1.32) (1.35) (1.47)
σ(%) 24.12 19.63 20.29 18.51 20.51 22.71
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Table B.13
Robustness Check: CAPM Regressions (Additional)
— Using An Alternative Classification of Routine-Task Labor
This table reports the unconditional CAPM time-series regression results in Panel A and
Conditional CAPM regression results in Panel B for five portfolios sorted on share of routine-
task labor (RShare) within industry. RShare is the ratio of a firm’s total wage expense
on its routine-task labor to its total wage expense, as defined in equation (24) using P75
instead of P80. At the end of each June, firms in each Fama-French 17 industry are sorted
into five equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare. RShare is lagged by 18 months.
Newey-West standard errors are estimated with four lags for the unconditional CAPM
monthly estimations and with one lag for the conditional CAPM yearly estimation, reported
in parentheses. CAPM alphas are annualized by multiplying by 12 and are reported in
percentages. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
L 2 3 4 H H−L
Panel A: Unconditional CAPM
MKT β 1.25∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.05∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
Constant 4.41∗ 3.30 3.99 3.64 2.64 −1.76
(2.62) (2.44) (2.52) (2.47) (2.49) (1.77)
R2 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.70 0.15
Panel B: Conditional CAPM
Avg. MKT β 1.59∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
Avg. α (%) 3.46 2.08 4.27 2.83 1.52 −1.93
(4.66) (4.10) (3.78) (3.43) (3.52) (2.20)
Avg. R2 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.32
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Table B.14
Cash Flow Beta and Discount Rate Beta
This table shows the decomposition of the market betas for five portfolios sorted on
share of routine-task labor. At the end of each June, firms in each Fama-French
17 industry are sorted into five equally weighted portfolios based on their RShare.
RShare is lagged by 18 months. βCF and βDR are the cash flow beta and the dis-
count rate beta, constructed following Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). See the
Internet Appendix of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Weber (2013) for more
detailed descriptions of the estimation procedure. β is the sum of the two betas. The
estimation period for the cash flow news and the discount rate news are from July
1962 to June 2014. The estimation period for the betas is from July 1991 to June
2014. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
L 2 3 4 H H-L
βCF 0.87
∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.02)
βDR 0.66
∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03)
β 1.53∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.05)
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Table B.15
Robustness Check: Conditional Betas and Stock Returns on RShare
—Using An Alternative Classification of Routine-Task Labor
This table reports the predictability of firms’ share of routine-task labor (RShare) on their
conditional betas and annual stock returns while controlling for known firm characteristics
that predict risk. Conditional betas are calculated following Lewellen and Nagel (2006) for
each year t. RShare is the ratio of a firm’s total wage expense on its routine-task labor
to its total wage expense, as defined in equation (24) using P75 instead of P80. Realized
annual stock returns are aggregated from July of year t to June of year t+ 1 in percentage.
RShare is lagged by 18 months. Ind indicates the Fama-French 17 industries. See the
Appendix for definitions of firm characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively. The sample covers stock returns from July 1991 to June 2014.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Conditional Betas
RSharet−1 -0.54
∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.54∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗



















Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.05
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Table B.15
Robustness Check: Conditional Betas and Stock Returns on RShare
—Using An Alternative Classification of Routine-Task Labor
— Continued
Panel B: Annual Stock Returns
RSharet−1 -5.31
∗∗∗ -5.01∗∗∗ -5.43∗∗∗ -6.31∗∗∗ -6.87∗∗∗ -6.19∗∗∗ -7.13∗∗∗ -8.03∗∗∗ -10.26∗∗∗



















Fixed Effects Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Ind×Yr Yr
Observations 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080 41,080
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.07
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